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INTRODUCTION 
The vast majority of attorneys in this country are required to complete 10 
to 15 hours of continuing legal education (“CLE”) every year, an experience 
well summarized by one attendee’s observation that “[k]nowledge is good, 
but coerced seat time is wasteful [and] insulting.”1 The primary rationale 
for mandatory CLE is to help ensure competent client representation, but 
the mandatory system fails to achieve that goal. Instead, mandatory CLE 
has become a self-perpetuating industry that earns hundreds of millions of 
tuition dollars for course purveyors but demonstrates little, if any, 
connection to better serving the public. 
By contrast, almost no attorney is required to complete a single hour 
of pro bono service. Although the American Bar Association (“ABA”) 
recognizes the “critical” need for free legal services for “persons of limited 
means,” attorneys simply are encouraged to volunteer their time.2 This 
voluntary pro bono system has proven to be so woefully inadequate that 
Justice Sonia Sotomayor recently declared her support for a “forced labor” 
approach to attorneys’ pro bono responsibilities.3  
Responding to this critical need, a current trend in the profession focuses 
on requiring pro bono service from law students and bar applicants—easy 
marks with little ability to protest.4 This effort, however, sidesteps the harder 
                                                                                                             
 1. James C. Mitchell, MCLE—The Joke’s On Us, 36 ARIZ. ATT’Y, Aug.–
Sept. 1999, at 27. Similar sentiments abound in the literature. See, e.g., Paul-Noel 
Chretien, The Bar’s Back-to-School Scam, WALL ST. J., Jan. 17, 1996, at A15 
(describing bar member opposition to mandatory CLE in the District of 
Columbia); Walter C. Davison, David C. Farmer & Elizabeth A. Kane, Taking the 
“M” out of MCLE, HAW. B.J., Aug. 2008, at 9 (describing opposition in Hawaii). 
 2. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 6.1 & cmt. 2 (AM. BAR ASS’N 
2016) [hereinafter MODEL RULES]. 
 3. See Tony Mauro, Sotomayor Pushes Mandatory Pro Bono, NAT’L L.J., 
May 23, 2016, at 17. 
 4. See Tom Lininger, Deregulating Public Interest Law, 88 TULANE L. REV. 
727, 738–39 (2014) (describing “shifted” focus of pro bono reform efforts to law 
students and bar applicants).  
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question of mandatory pro bono for licensed attorneys, including the law 
professors who may be an aspiring attorney’s first professional role models.  
More than a decade ago, Dean Erwin Chemerinsky argued in favor of 
mandatory pro bono service for law faculty, hoping to “at least induce 
debate and force examination of how to better engage law professors in 
using their talents to help those who need it.”5 That debate has yet to 
materialize. Law professors have at least as much of an obligation as other 
attorneys to provide pro bono service, but their resistance to doing so has 
resulted in rates of participation that Professor Deborah Rhode has 
described as “shameful.”6 
This Article argues that the time is ripe to upend the status quo—to 
eliminate mandatory CLE and to explore replacing mandatory CLE hours 
with required pro bono service hours. Part I documents the enormous reach 
and substantial cost of mandatory CLE—all without any evidence of 
efficacy. Part II establishes that regulations protecting the legal profession 
both substantially contribute to the vast need for free legal representation 
and justify a pro bono requirement for attorneys. Part III explores obstacles 
to eliminating mandatory CLE and requiring pro bono, including political 
opposition and the absence of mandatory pro bono models. Part IV 
responds to this problem with a proposal: encouraging law faculties to 
impose pro bono requirements on themselves with the incentive of 
eliminating their mandatory CLE obligations. This faculty test case model 
offers enormous potential benefits for the indigent clients who would be 
served, the law students who would find role models for a lifetime of 
service, the professors whose teaching and scholarship would be enriched, 
and the profession, which would gain much-needed experience with 
various approaches to mandatory pro bono.  
                                                                                                             
 5. Erwin Chemerinsky, A Pro Bono Requirement for Faculty Members, 37 
LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1235, 1236 (2004). Chemerinsky, recently named Dean of 
Berkeley Law, is “widely considered to be a giant in legal education.” Austin 
Weinstein, Erwin Chemerinsky Named Berkeley Law Dean, DAILY CALIFORNIAN 
(May 17, 2017), http://www.dailycal.org/2017/05/17/erwin-chemerinsky-named-
berkeley-law-dean/ [https://perma.cc/3S2K-76MJ]. 
 6. Deborah L. Rhode, Legal Ethics in Legal Education, 16 CLINICAL L. REV. 
43, 54 (2009). Rhode, a Stanford Law School professor, has been described as 
“the nation’s foremost expert on lawyers’ ethical duty to perform pro bono 
service.” Tom Lininger, From Park Place to Community Chest: Rethinking 
Lawyers’ Monopoly, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1343, 1343 (2007) (reviewing DEBORAH 
L. RHODE, PRO BONO IN PRINCIPLE AND IN PRACTICE: PUBLIC SERVICE AND THE 
PROFESSIONS (2005)).  
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I. STATUS QUO: MANDATORY CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION  
In the 1960s and 1970s, the organized bar promoted mandatory CLE 
as an answer to the concern that the rising number of new attorneys had 
led to a decrease in the quality of lawyering, a sentiment famously 
expressed by Chief Justice Warren Burger in his comments concerning the 
“inadequacies” of courtroom counsel.7 Mandatory CLE remains firmly 
entrenched in the legal profession, bringing a substantial windfall for the 
institutional interests that profit from the system but little, if any, 
demonstrable public benefit. 
A. Rationale, Rules, and Numbers 
The primary rationale for mandatory CLE hinges on the alleged value 
of these programs in helping to ensure attorney competence.8 To be sure, 
attorneys reap other benefits from CLE classes, such as opportunities for 
intellectual growth and professional advancement, but attorneys can make 
individual decisions as to whether personal benefits of this sort are worth 
the time and expense involved.9 These personal benefits do not justify a 
mandatory scheme.  
                                                                                                             
 7. See Warren E. Burger, The Special Skills of Advocacy: Are Specialized 
Training and Certification of Advocates Essential to Our System of Justice?, 42 
FORDHAM L. REV. 227, 238 (1973); see also Cheri A. Harris, MCLE: The Perils, 
Pitfalls, and Promise of Regulation, 40 VAL. U. L. REV. 359, 361 (2006); Deborah 
L. Rhode & Lucy Buford Ricca, Revisiting MCLE: Is Compulsory Passive 
Learning Building Better Lawyers?, 22 PROF. LAW. 2, 3 (2014).  
 8. “Competence” in this context broadly refers to the “legal knowledge, skill, 
thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary” for client representation. 
MODEL RULES r. 1.1. All American jurisdictions require “competence” as a matter 
of professional conduct, and most put the “competence” rule before all others. Links 
to each jurisdiction’s rules of professional conduct, including each jurisdiction’s 
version of Model Rule 1.1, are collected at Links of Interest, AM. BAR ASS’N., 
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/resources/links_of
_interest.html (last visited Sept. 30, 2017) [https://perma.cc/7DFE-TKZU]. 
 9. For example, attorneys can expand their professional prospects by taking 
courses in potential new areas of practice and making new contacts at in-person 
trainings. The opportunity to make professional contacts is a particular marketing 
focus for organizations peddling extended CLE offerings in relaxed vacation 
settings. See generally Robert J. Derocher, Combining Learning and 
Entertainment: The New CLE?, BAR LEADER, May–June 2004, at 21. One CLE 
purveyor, for example, assembles a mutually beneficial combination of doctors, 
dentists, and attorneys through “Medical-Dental-Legal Update” courses offered 
“away from the distractions and tumult of your practice” in “34 premier destination 
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Improved attorney competence could justify a mandatory scheme if 
mandatory CLE actually resulted in better representation for clients.10 
Leaving competence to an individual attorney’s discretion is problematic 
because incompetent attorneys may be unlikely to seek out training or even 
realize that they need it.11 Leaving competence to market forces also is 
problematic because most clients cannot easily discern attorney 
incompetence.12 
The organized bar has assumed responsibility for maintaining profession-
wide competence. The bar’s efforts in this regard begin with entry-to-practice 
hurdles: graduation from an accredited law school; passing the bar exam; and 
satisfying character and fitness requirements. At the other end of the 
professional continuum is the disciplinary process, which retroactively 
assesses and punishes alleged incompetence in particular cases.13 Bridging 
the gap is CLE, which is designed to help new attorneys gain full 
competence as well as maintain and sharpen competence throughout 
attorneys’ careers.14 
                                                                                                             
resorts.” See About AEI, AM. EDUC. INST., https://www.aeiseminars.com/about-
aei/about-aei/ (last visited Sept. 30, 2017) [https://perma.cc/TVN3-NJE5].  
 10. See, e.g., Joseph Faulhaber, Mandatory Continuing Legal Education: 
For, ALASKA B. RAG, Mar.–Apr. 1998, at 14 (arguing that “the burden of 
protecting those whom [the legal] profession serves” justifies mandatory CLE); 
Mary Frances Edwards, Mandatory CLE: Shield or Sham?, 3 J. PROF. LEGAL 
EDUC. 27, 30–31 (1985); Jordan W. Lorence, Alan E. Sears & Benjamin W. Bull, 
No Official High or Petty: The Unnecessary, Unwise, And Unconstitutional Trend 
of Prescribing Viewpoint Orthodoxy in Mandatory Continuing Legal Education, 
44 S. TEX. L. REV. 263, 270–72 (2002); Alan Ogden, Mandatory Continuing 
Legal Education: A Study of Its Effects, 3 J. PROF. LEGAL EDUC. 3, 4 (1985–1986); 
Andrew M. Perlman, A Behavioral Theory of Legal Ethics, 90 IND. L.J. 1639, 
1666–67 (2015); Colleen G. Segall, Ethics in Mandatory CLE: An Overlooked 
Means for Improving the Standard of the Profession, 6 J. PROF. LEGAL EDUC. 22, 
25 (1988).  
 11.  See Randall T. Shepard, The “L” In “CLE” Stands For “Legal”, 40 
VAL. U. L. REV. 311, 317–18 (2006) (“We cannot assume that . . . the attorney will 
be able to recognize his own lack of competence.”). 
 12.  See, e.g., Soha Turfler, A Model Definition of the Practice of Law: If Not 
Now, When? An Alternative Approach To Defining the Practice of Law, 61 WASH. 
& LEE L. REV. 1903, 1919–20 (2004) (explaining the “information asymmetry” 
that leaves clients “unable to evaluate the quality” of their attorney’s services). 
 13. See, e.g., William E. Hornsby, Jr., Ad Rules Infinitum: The Need for 
Alternatives to State-Based Ethics Governing Legal Services Marketing, 36 U. 
RICHMOND L. REV. 49, 54 (2002); Anthony J. Luppino, Multidisciplinary 
Business Planning Firms: Expanding the Regulatory Tent Without Creating a 
Circus, 35 SETON HALL L. REV. 109, 146 (2004).  
 14. See Shepard, supra note 11, at 324. 
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Rules of professional conduct reflect the bar’s oversight and instruct 
attorneys to maintain competence, in part, through compliance with “all 
continuing legal education requirements to which the lawyer is subject.”15 
Minnesota and Iowa adopted the first mandatory CLE measures in 1975;16 
now, 46 states impose mandatory CLE requirements.17 Almost all mandatory 
CLE jurisdictions require an average of between 10 and 15 CLE hours per 
year.18  
No publicly available source quantifies the number of attorneys 
nationally who are subject to mandatory CLE. The ABA collects data on the 
total number of active attorneys by state,19 but each mandatory CLE 
jurisdiction exempts different groups of attorneys from the requirement. Such 
exemptions commonly include attorneys on active military duty, federal and 
state judges, various elected officials, and attorneys of retirement age.20 No 
                                                                                                             
 15. MODEL RULES r. 1.1 cmt. 8. Furthermore, the ABA has adopted a separate 
“Model Rule for Minimum Continuing Legal Education,” providing model 
guidance to the states regarding the particulars of mandatory CLE programs. See 
MODEL RULE FOR MINIMUM CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION (AM. BAR ASS’N 
2017), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/images/abanews/2017%20 
Midyear%20Meeting%20Resolutions/106.pdf [https://perma.cc/PMJ6-8TFN]. 
 16. See Rocio T. Aliaga, Framing the Debate On Mandatory Continuing 
Legal Education (MCLE): The District of Columbia Bar’s Consideration of 
MCLE, 8 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1145, 1150–51 (1995).  
 17. Links to each jurisdiction’s mandatory CLE rules are available at MCLE 
Information by Jurisdiction, AM. BAR ASS’N, http://www.americanbar.org/cle 
/mandatory_cle/mcle_states.html (last visited Sept. 10, 2017) [https://perma.cc 
/S7AQ-RV5U]. The District of Columbia, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, 
and South Dakota generally do not require CLE credits, although the District of 
Columbia and Massachusetts do require newly admitted attorneys to take specific 
courses on local practice and professional responsibility. See R. GOVERNING THE 
D.C. BAR II § 3; MASS. ANN. R. OF THE SUPREME JUD. CT. 3:16. Michigan 
rescinded a new-attorney CLE requirement in 1994. See infra notes 160–164 and 
accompanying text.  
 18. Some states spread the requirement over two or three years. See, e.g., SUP. 
CT. R. FOR THE GOV’T OF THE BAR OF OHIO R. X § 3 (requiring 24 CLE hours 
over two years); COLO. R. CIV. P. 260.2 (requiring 45 CLE hours over three years). 
Only two mandatory CLE states require fewer than ten hours per year. See 
ALASKA BAR R. 65(a) (requiring three hours per year); R. OF THE SUP. CT. OF 
HAW. 22(a) (same). 
 19. See ABA National Lawyer Population Survey, AM. BAR ASS’N (2016), 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/market_research/national
-lawyer-population-by-state-2016.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/VJJ9-7QTA]. 
 20. The exemptions allowed by each jurisdiction can be found in that 
jurisdiction’s mandatory CLE rules. See MCLE Information by Jurisdiction, 
supra note 17. By way of example, see CONN. SUPER. CT. R. § 2-27A(a)(3).   
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source, however, delineates by state the number of attorneys in the various 
exempted groups.  
Projecting from the best data available, approximately 950,000 attorneys 
will fulfill approximately 11.5 million mandatory CLE hours in 2017. The 
950,000 attorneys figure represents 83% of the number of active attorneys in 
each of the 46 mandatory CLE jurisdictions, with 83% approximating the 
number of attorneys who are not exempt from the requirement.21 The 11.5 
million hours figure represents the number of non-exempt attorneys in each 
state multiplied by the number of CLE hours required by that state.22 These 
figures probably undercount both the number of attorneys and the number of 
hours;23 even so, the figures demonstrate the enormity of the undertaking that 
mandatory CLE has become. 
B. Mandatory CLE Does Not Improve Attorney Competence 
Do these 11.5 million hours render 950,000 attorneys more competent 
than their counterparts in non-mandatory CLE states? If the relevant measure 
                                                                                                             
 21. Attorneys in private practice and in private industry together comprise 
83% of United States attorneys. See Lawyer Demographics, AM. BAR ASS’N 
(2016), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/market_re 
search/lawyer-demographics-tables-2016.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z 
H4N-29JS]. Although these percentages are from 2005, they are the most recent 
figures available from the ABA. The author chose 83% for these calculations 
because attorneys in these two categories are unlikely to be exempt from CLE 
requirements. The ABA’s 2016 data lists 1,142,906 active attorneys in the 46 
mandatory CLE jurisdictions, ABA National Lawyer Population Survey, supra 
note 19; 83% of that number is 948,612. Calculations on file with author.  
 22. For example, the ABA reported that Alabama had 14,466 active attorneys 
in 2016. 83% of that number is 12,173 attorneys. Alabama requires 12 CLE hours 
per year, which—multiplied by 12,173—results in 146,073 mandatory CLE hours 
for Alabama. This process was repeated for each mandatory CLE jurisdiction. The 
mandatory CLE hours per state were added together for a total of 11,497,530 
hours. Calculations on file with author. 
 23. For example, although these calculations include only “private practice” 
and “private industry” attorneys, see supra note 21, many government and other 
attorneys working outside of these sectors are subject to mandatory CLE 
requirements. See, e.g., ARK. JUDICIARY R. FOR MINIMUM CONTINUING LEGAL 
EDUC. 2 (exempting only senior and inactive attorneys from mandatory CLE 
requirements). Moreover, the calculations here do not include the higher hourly 
requirements that may be imposed on particular groups of attorneys, such as 
newly admitted attorneys in certain states. See, e.g., N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & 
REGS. tit. 22, §§ 1500.12(a), 1500.22 (requiring 16 hours for newly admitted 
attorneys “in each of the first two years of admission to the Bar” as opposed to 
the 24 hours per two years required for other attorneys). 
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is merely CLE attendance, then the answer is “yes.” Attorneys, like other 
professionals, avoid time-consuming and expensive activities like CLE unless 
attendance is required.24 Not surprisingly, the literature readily documents a 
sharp increase in attendance once a jurisdiction changes from voluntary to 
mandatory CLE attendance.25  
Attendance as the measure of success, however, assumes that competence—
the rationale for mandatory CLE—actually is enhanced by attending CLE 
courses.26 With competence itself as the appropriate measure, the attorneys in 
mandatory CLE states appear to lack any advantage over their counterparts in 
non-mandatory states. As discussed below, no data supports the conclusion 
that mandatory CLE has any positive effect on attorney competence. 
Moreover, this lack of supportive data is consistent with what adult learning 
theory would predict: the structure of CLE courses and the mandatory system 
itself discourage substantial or lasting results. 
1. No Data Despite Opportunity and Incentive 
The 46 states that have adopted mandatory CLE measures since 1975 
provide a ready-made source of empirical data to test the proposition that 
attorneys in these states have a competence advantage over attorneys in non-
mandatory states. In 1997, Professor Colleen Graffy found “no statistics 
indicating a reduction in complaints, disciplinary measures or malpractice 
insurance premiums since [mandatory CLE’s] implementation,”27 and none 
have materialized since.28  
                                                                                                             
 24. See, e.g., Harris, supra note 7, at 370 (“One reason mandatory education 
is effective is because it reaches the significant number of people who do not take 
courses unless required.”); Rhode & Ricca, supra note 7, at 7. 
 25. See, e.g., Kimberlee K. Kovach, Lawyer Ethics Must Keep Pace with 
Practice: Plurality in Lawyering Roles Demands Diverse and Innovative Ethical 
Standards, 39 IDAHO L. REV. 399, 416–17 (2003); Ogden, supra note 10, at 10–11. 
 26. See, e.g., Martin P. Moltz, Viewpoint: Debate Over MCLE Continues: 
Mandatory CLE—A Better Idea Now Than Ever Before, 11 CBA REC. 44, 44 
(1997) (“Sadly, only the spectre of mandatory CLE will likely result in the 
desirable goal of having every lawyer ‘keep up with the law’ in their respective 
fields.”). 
 27. Colleen Graffy, Mandatory Continuing Legal Education, 147 NEW L.J. 
1650, 1651 (1997). Earlier writers similarly observed the lack of data supporting 
a link between mandatory CLE and competence. See Aliaga, supra note 16, at 
1164; David A. Thomas, Why Mandatory CLE Is a Mistake, 6 UTAH B.J., Jan. 
1993, at 14, 14. 
 28. See, e.g., Davison, Farmer & Kane, supra note 1, at 9; Donald S. Murphy 
& Thomas Schwen, The Future: Transitioning from Training Lawyers to Improving 
Their Performance, 40 VAL. U. L. REV. 521, 521 (2006); Rhode & Ricca, supra 
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Some mandatory CLE proponents acknowledge the absence of empirical 
data but respond that no data disprove mandatory CLE’s impact on competence 
either.29 This argument has an appealing even-handedness, but it is a superficial 
appeal. The fight between opponents and supporters of mandatory CLE occurs 
on a vastly unequal playing field, and the burden of proving the mandatory 
system’s connection to competence should fall squarely on the latter group’s 
shoulders.30  
Opposition to mandatory CLE comes primarily from individual attorneys, 
with some attorneys far more negatively impacted by the requirement than 
others. Many larger firms provide in-house CLE courses, cover their attorneys’ 
CLE tuition costs, or at least provide salaries generous enough for their 
attorneys to cover CLE costs themselves with little trouble.31 Solo practitioners 
and others who work in smaller or less profitable offices, however, have little 
capacity to absorb the loss of hours and dollars that mandatory CLE 
demands.32  
Proponents of mandatory CLE, on the other hand, include a broad range 
of organized interests with substantial resources to assess the mandatory 
                                                                                                             
note 7, at 8. See generally Holly B. Fisher & W. Franklin Spikes, Examining the 
Relationship Between Learning, Continuing Legal Education, and the 
Improvement of the Practice of Law, in TRAINING INITIATIVES AND STRATEGIES 
FOR THE MODERN WORKFORCE (Scott Frasard & Frederick Carl Prasuhn eds., 
2017) (discussing the need for better data). 
 29. See, e.g., Edwards, supra note 10, at 31; Neil Gold, Beyond Competence: 
The Case for Mandatory Continuing Learning in Law, 4 J. PROF. LEGAL EDUC. 
17, 19 (1986).  
 30. See, e.g., Jack Joseph, Mandatory Continuing Legal Education—An 
Opponent’s View, 75 ILL. B.J.  256, 256 (1987).  
 31. See, e.g., Alex Rich, 5 Super Easy Tips for Finding Cheap CLE Credits, 
ABOVE THE LAW (Jan. 8, 2014, 10:12 AM), http://abovethelaw.com/2014/01/5-
super-easy-tips-for-finding-cheap-cle-credits/ (noting CLE costs are a common 
benefit for “Biglaw” attorneys) [https://perma.cc/XSH2-EP6R]. 
 32. See Carolyn Elefant, Why Can’t CLE Deliver Real Value to Solos By 
Teaching Real Skills?, ABOVE THE LAW (Aug. 30, 2016, 6:02 PM), http://above 
thelaw.com/2016/08/why-cant-cle-deliver-real-value-to-solos-by-teaching-real-  
skills/?rf=1 (“CLE requirements disproportionately hurt solo lawyers who often 
lack the money for the pricier CLEs. Moreover, some CLE programs are priced 
in such a way that there’s effectively a ‘solo tax,’ since the costs can’t be spread 
across multiple participants. Finally, for a true solo, time spent at CLE displaces 
hours available for billing, so on top of the price tag for the program, solo 
attendance at CLE also has an opportunity cost.”) [https://perma.cc/5QA9-
CNL9]; Faulhaber, supra note 10, at 14 (noting that mandatory CLE tends to drive 
“marginal” attorneys out of business); Thomas, supra note 27, at 14 (noting 
mandatory CLE’s potentially discriminatory impact on less affluent attorneys).  
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system’s impact on attorney competence. Private CLE purveyors are major 
players in the industry. So, too, are bar associations and law schools33—both 
of which may be particularly dependent on CLE revenues as a result of the 
downturn in the legal market and law school admissions.34 Various CLE trade 
groups further support the industry.35 
These organized interests rely on mandatory CLE to put bodies in the 
chairs and tuition dollars in the bank. Course providers generally do not 
make revenue data publicly available,36 and few outside observers have 
attempted specific calculations.37 But, taking again the conservative 
                                                                                                             
 33. See, e.g., Kenneth D. Dean, Models for Organizing Law School CLE 
Programs, 4 CLE J. 23, 24 (2001); Derocher, supra note 9, at 21; DEBORAH L. 
RHODE, THE TROUBLE WITH LAWYERS 106 (2015).  
 34. See, e.g., Gregg Toppo, Why You Might Want to Think Twice Before 
Going to Law School, USA TODAY (June 28, 2017), https://www.usatoday.com 
/story/news/2017/06/28/law-schools-hunkering-down-enrollment-slips/4302130  
01/ [https://perma.cc/C24V-2GS5]. 
 35. Trade groups include the Continuing Legal Education Regulators 
Association (“CLEreg”), composed of mandatory CLE administrators and staff, 
see About Us, CLEREG, https://www.clereg.org/about (last visited Sept. 30, 2017) 
[https://perma.cc/UXB4-EBJP], and the Association for Continuing Legal Education 
(“ACLEA”), an international group, see About ACLEA, ASS’N FOR CONTINUING 
LEGAL EDUC., http://www.aclea.org/?page=about (last visited Sept. 30, 2017) [https: 
//perma.cc/WE4P-U8PR]. 
 36. For example, the ABA and many state bar associations provide no CLE 
revenue information at all. Others provide annual financial reports that include an 
expansive category like “Education” that presumably includes both mandatory 
CLE and other educational endeavors, though no particulars are provided. See, 
e.g., N.J. STATE BAR ASS’N, 2016-2017 ANNUAL REPORT 8 (2017), https://tcms 
.njsba.com/personifyebusiness/Portals/0/NJSBA-PDF/Reports%20&%20Com  
ments/AR2016.pdf (reporting $6.1 million in “Education” revenue) [https://per 
ma.cc/5J2J-WKAR]. Among the few bar associations providing specific 
mandatory CLE course revenue figures is California. See STATE BAR OF CAL., 
2015 FINANCIAL STATEMENT AND INDEPENDENT AUDITOR’S REPORT 12, 43 
(2016), http://www.calbar.ca.gov/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=JD0OoHV0qJQ%3 
d&tabid=224&mid=1534 (reporting $971,849 in revenue from CLE fees) 
[https://perma.cc/DFL6-SFAN]. 
 37. See, e.g., Cost-Effective Ways to Meet CLE Requirements, WIS. L.J. (Mar. 
30, 2009, 1:00 AM), http://wislawjournal.com/2009/03/30/costeffective-ways-to-
meet-cle-requirements (referencing mandatory CLE’s “substantial price tag” but 
providing no specific amounts) [https://perma.cc/9ZAX-F8NZ]. 20 years ago, one 
critic undertook a more specific calculation, albeit with little detail regarding his 
underlying data. See Chretien, supra note 1, at A15. Chretien estimated that 
630,000 attorneys took an average of 12 mandatory CLE hours per year with each 
hour costing a minimum of $20. See id. These 1996 figures would have totaled 
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estimate of 950,000 attorneys fulfilling 11.5 million mandatory course 
hours,38 mandatory CLE tuition revenue for 2017 reasonably can be 
estimated at a minimum of $345 million.39 The magnitude of proponents’ 
financial incentive to maintain the mandatory system renders the absence 
of correlative data at least suspicious.40 Were there a correlation to be 
found, mandatory CLE proponents should have been able to demonstrate 
by now that the system actually achieves its competence-enhancing 
purposes.  
To say that no data supports a correlation between mandatory CLE 
and competence is no exaggeration. Many surveys assess participants’ 
positive and negative views about CLE programs.41 Mandatory CLE 
proponents, however, point to only two sources of data as broad evidence 
of a mandatory CLE-competence correlation: malpractice insurance 
premiums and disciplinary actions. Neither source supports the mandatory 
cause. 
                                                                                                             
approximately $151 million at that time; adding in the dollar value of time lost by 
participating lawyers brought Chretien’s total estimate to $360 million per year. 
See id. 
 38. See supra notes 21–24 and accompanying text. 
 39. To calculate this figure, the author assumed $30 per credit hour. Thirty 
dollars per credit hour is one author’s relatively recent low-end estimate of CLE 
tuition costs, an estimate that excluded both free courses and the most expensive 
options. See Claudine V. Pease-Wingenter, Halting the Profession’s Female 
Brain Drain While Increasing the Provision of Legal Services to the Poor: A 
Proposal to Revamp and Expand Emeritus Attorney Programs, 37 OKLA. CITY U. 
L. REV. 433, 459 (2012) (estimating CLE tuition at $30–$50 per credit hour and 
noting that most attorneys cannot fulfill all required hours through free and low-
cost options). 
 40. The financial incentive has been present from the industry’s beginnings. 
See Marvin E. Frankel, Curing Lawyers’ Incompetence: Primum Non Nocere, 10 
CREIGHTON L. REV. 613, 614 (1977) (describing mandatory CLE as a “major 
growth industry” shortly after mandatory CLE rules were first adopted in 1975). 
 41. Compare, e.g., David S. Caudill, Sympathy for the Devil?: Reflections on 
the Crime-Fraud Exception to Client Confidentiality, 8 J. OF CIV. RTS. AND ECON. 
DEV. 369, 371–72, 372 n.6 (1993) (describing a survey in which 89% of 
respondents stated that CLE programs do not “diminish incompetent or unethical 
lawyering”), with ILL. SUPREME COURT COMM’N ON PROF’LISM, 2012 LAWYER 
FEEDBACK ON CLE 3 (2012) (describing survey in which 61.6% of respondents 
reported participating “in a professional responsibility CLE course that resulted 
in my increased knowledge or capability”). Most respondents to a recent survey 
of Kansas CLE providers said that CLE was “effective” or “very effective” in 
improving attorney practice, but this conclusion was based more on belief than on 
measured practice improvement. See Fisher & Spikes, supra note 28, at 101–02. 
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a. Malpractice Insurance  
First, proponents cite the lower malpractice premiums offered in some 
mandatory CLE jurisdictions as evidence of the mandatory system’s 
positive impact on both competence and an attorney’s bottom line.42 
According to this line of reasoning, malpractice insurers—who lack any 
reason to favor mandatory CLE if it does not reduce the number of claims 
and the amounts paid out—must have determined that mandatory CLE 
correlates with lowered malpractice levels.43  
The malpractice insurance argument is without foundation. Some 
assertions of a correlation between mandatory CLE and lowered premiums 
simply rely on older, unsupported statements to this effect.44 The only 
substantiated claims demonstrate lowered premiums for attorneys who 
voluntarily attend specific malpractice-reduction programs offered or 
approved by insurers.45 In other words, the reduction does not derive from 
the existence of a mandatory CLE requirement that may be satisfied 
through a vast variety of courses. Indeed, Professor Mary Frances Edwards 
                                                                                                             
 42. See, e.g., Harris, supra note 7, at 367; Ogden, supra note 10, at 9; Chris 
Ziegler & Justin Kuhn, Is MCLE a Good Thing? An Inquiry Into MCLE and 
Attorney Discipline, CLEREG, at 7 & n.8, https://www.clereg.org/assets/pdf 
/Is_MCLE_A_Good_Thing.pdf (last visited Sept. 8, 2017) [https://perma.cc 
/Q9BH-SVWZ]. Although the Ziegler and Kuhn paper is undated, references 
within the paper suggest that it was likely written in 2013. 
 43. See, e.g., Faulhaber, supra note 10, at 14 (arguing that mandatory CLE 
adoption in Alaska will reduce premiums because mandatory CLE leads to fewer 
attorney mistakes, which in turn leads to fewer malpractice claims). 
 44. For example, Ziegler and Kuhn argue that lower malpractice insurance 
premiums in some mandatory CLE jurisdictions reflect its efficacy, but they rely 
solely on Cheri Harris’s 2006 article. Ziegler & Kuhn, supra note 42, at 7 & n.48. 
Harris, in turn, relies solely on Alan Ogden’s 1984 article, which itself relies 
solely on a 1983 ABA report that the best efforts of the author and the Georgetown 
Law Library Research Service were unable to locate. See Harris, supra note 7, at 
367; Ogden, supra note 10, at 9; see also JUTTA KATH, CONTROLLING LEGAL 
MALPRACTICE INSURANCE COST AND AVAILABILITY IN A CHANGING 
MARKETPLACE 5 (2002) (providing no citation for a similar argument regarding 
insurance premiums); TASK FORCE ON CONTINUING LEGAL EDUC., REPORT TO 
THE BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA BAR 114–15 (Jan. 
1995) (noting the absence of data establishing malpractice differentials in 
mandatory versus non-mandatory CLE jurisdictions). 
 45. See, e.g., Fotios M. Burtzos, Mandatory CLE: Knowledge is Good, COLO. 
LAW., May 2005, at 39–40, 40 n.1 (describing small premium reduction for 
insureds who participate in certain CLE programs); Kevin R. Culhane & John E. 
Hurley, Jr., Insurance Situation Not Quite Hopeless, RECORDER, Apr. 5, 2002, at 
5 (same).  
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found that not only does the data not support a correlation between 
mandatory CLE and lowered malpractice claims but also that the lowered 
premium rates probably were “more the result of tough negotiation by state 
bar associations with their official malpractice carriers than evidence of 
faith in CLE by the insurance carriers.”46  
b. Disciplinary Action  
The only other effort to establish a data-driven link between 
mandatory CLE and improved competence is a recent paper whose title 
asks, “Is [Mandatory] CLE a Good Thing?”47 This paper was published by 
a mandatory CLE trade organization, and—as might be expected given the 
interests of the publisher—the authors answer this question in the affirmative.48 
The authors’ own data and analysis, however, belie their conclusion. 
The paper describes a study testing the hypothesis that mandatory CLE 
adoption improves attorney performance and that this improvement would 
be reflected in lowered attorney disciplinary rates.49 The authors reviewed 
disciplinary statistics in five of the six jurisdictions that implemented 
mandatory CLE between 2000 and 2010.50 Looking at disciplinary data 
from three years before and three years after mandatory CLE 
implementation,51 the authors determined that their hypothesis was correct, 
notwithstanding that most of the data pointed in the opposite direction.52  
The study focused on three distinct points in the disciplinary process: 
(1) disciplinary complaints filed; (2) cases docketed for further proceedings 
after preliminary investigation of the complaint; and (3) findings of 
misconduct.53 The authors found no statistically significant correlations for 
categories (1) and (3); in other words, mandatory CLE did not decrease 
                                                                                                             
 46. Edwards, supra note 10, at 30–31 (relying on survey data from Colorado). 
Even if evidence demonstrated lower malpractice premiums in mandatory CLE 
states, various factors go into premium calculations, including law office size and 
area of practice. See, e.g., Tom Baker & Rick Swedloff, Liability Insurer Data as 
a Window on Lawyers’ Professional Liability, 5 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 1273, 1285 
n.38 (2015). Any statistical analysis would need to account for state-by-state 
variations on these metrics.  
 47. See Ziegler & Kuhn, supra note 42.  
 48. See id. at 1.  
 49. See id. 
 50. The five states studied were Alaska, Hawaii, Illinois, Maine, and New 
Jersey. The sixth state, Nebraska, did not make disciplinary statistics available. 
Id. at 9–10. 
 51. Id. at 11–12. 
 52. See id. at 14. 
 53. Id. at 10. 
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complaints about attorney competence or the number of cases in which 
incompetent representation was found to have actually occurred.54 Instead, the 
only significant correlation was for category (2), the least relevant measure: 
the number of complaints moved through the system for decision.55 
These authors took on a task long sidestepped in the mandatory CLE 
debate: attempting to fill in the persistent data gap. Their idea makes sense; 
a statistically significant reduction in attorney discipline after mandatory 
CLE adoption could indicate that mandatory CLE has a positive effect on 
attorney competence. Even taking the authors’ statistical analysis at face 
value, however, their affirmative conclusion leaps well ahead of their 
data.56  
2. Mandatory CLE Structure 
Faced with the absence of data, mandatory CLE proponents appeal to 
a commonsense assumption that mandatory CLE must positively impact 
attorney competence.57 Even unwilling attorneys, the reasoning goes, are 
bound to learn something useful from attending CLE courses. As argued 
by one proponent of mandatory CLE, “Even if no statistics prove [that 
mandatory] CLE improves competence, there are numerous attorneys who 
                                                                                                             
 54. See id. at 13. 
 55. See id.  
 56. Ironically, the absence of data demonstrating any connection between 
mandatory CLE and competence also undermines clients’ ability to claim 
ineffective assistance based on counsel’s failure to comply with CLE 
requirements. See, e.g., People v. Ngo, 924 P.2d 97, 101–02 (Cal. 1996) (citing 
lack of data in rejecting ineffective assistance claim that relied on attorney’s 
failure to comply with mandatory CLE regulations); State v. Lentz, 844 So. 2d 
837, 841–42 (La. 2003) (following Ngo); cf. Commonwealth v. Grant, 992 A.2d 
152, 154–55, 160 & n.5 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2010) (finding ineffective assistance when 
attorney had drug convictions and numerous other disciplinary violations as well 
as failure to complete CLE requirements).   
 57. See, e.g., D. Franklin Arey, III, Competent Appellate Advocacy and 
Continuing Legal Education: Fitting the Means to the End, 2 J. APP. PRAC. & 
PROCESS 27, 41 (2000) (“[T]his essay assumes the effectiveness of CLE programs 
in improving participant competence,” notwithstanding the absence of evidence 
to this effect); Edwards, supra note 10, at 30 (“[A]lthough it cannot be proved, 
[mandatory] CLE probably has a positive effect on competence.”); Harris, supra 
note 7, at 370–71 (“Even without statistical proof that [mandatory] CLE is 
effective, many in the profession seem to take for granted that [it] is key to 
maintaining attorney competence.”); Ogden, supra note 10, at 9 (acknowledging 
author’s own belief that mandatory CLE positively affects competence even 
though it cannot be proven by objective or scientific means). 
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are sued, suspended or disbarred for incompetence or unethical behavior 
in every state every year. Something must be done.”58  
That “something,” however, is not mandatory CLE. The structure of 
the mandatory system and of most CLE courses thwarts any positive 
connection to improved competence. Proponents’ absence of correlative 
data, in other words, is entirely consistent with what should be expected 
from the mandatory CLE status quo.  
One reality of the mandatory system that undermines a connection to 
attorney competence is the fact that an attorney can satisfy CLE 
requirements with courses that have little or no bearing on that attorney’s 
actual law practice. For example, Alabama annually requires 12 hours of 
CLE courses, which can cover any topic as long as one hour addresses 
“ethics” issues.59 Thus, an Alabama divorce lawyer can fulfill her CLE 
requirements through courses ranging from “Banking Law Update” to 
“The Legacy of To Kill a Mockingbird” to “Law and the Imagining of 
Difference”—a typical sampling of one vendor’s Alabama-approved 
offerings in early 2017.60 The range of topics may be personally satisfying 
for the attorney and may reduce her resentment toward the requirement.61 
The vast array of courses also may allow her to pick the lowest cost or 
most convenient option when the mandatory CLE certification deadline 
looms. This breadth of choice, however, belies the assertion that 
mandatory CLE better protects clients from incompetent representation.62 
Moreover, the assumption that productive learning will occur simply 
by putting CLE teachers and attendees in the same space is problematic 
                                                                                                             
 58. Lisa A. Grigg, Note, The Mandatory Continuing Legal Education 
(MCLE) Debate: Is It Improving Lawyer Competence Or Just Busy Work?, 12 
BYU J. PUB. L. 417, 427 (1998).  
 59. See Alabama: MCLE Requirements, AM. BAR ASS’N, http://www.american 
bar.org/cle/mandatory_cle/mcle_states/states_a-k/alabama.html (last visited Sept. 
30, 2017) [https://perma.cc/QP8C-JUNX].  Links to similar descriptions of each 
state’s mandatory CLE requirements can be found at MCLE Information by 
Jurisdiction, supra note 17.  
 60. See CLE ALABAMA (Sept. 30, 2017), http://www.clealabama.com/ 
[https://perma.cc/QW56-QQAL]. 
 61. See Shepard, supra note 11, at 312.  
 62. See Frankel, supra note 40, at 628 (noting mandatory CLE’s “fungible” 
hours requirement, “during which everybody must be educated in something, no 
matter what”); Shepard, supra note 11, at 323 (arguing against mandatory CLE 
credit for courses with only “indirect” benefit to clients). Allowing a wide range 
of courses to meet mandatory CLE requirements may promote “good public 
citizen[ship]” generally, Jay Conison, Law School Education and Liberal CLE, 
40 VAL. U. L. REV. 325, 340–41 (2006), but the connection to competence is too 
strained to justify a massive national CLE requirement. 
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even when attendance is voluntary. Widely accepted “best practices” for 
adult learning include substantial student-instructor interaction, interaction 
among students, high expectations for students, prompt feedback, and active 
learning rather than passive listening.63 Most CLE courses, however, 
consist of nothing more than a lecture with some time set aside at the end 
for the lecturer to respond to questions or comments; the session requires 
no substantive preparation or follow-up and allows for little meaningful 
interactivity.64 These common CLE characteristics are a model of how not 
to reach adult learners and help explain why so many CLE courses leave 
so little lasting impact.65 
A reasonable response to the overall lack of effective course design 
could be to design better courses—that is, create CLE offerings that more 
thoughtfully incorporate adult learning principles. Many commentators 
have proposed improvements in this regard.66 This approach, however, is 
unlikely to improve substantially the overall experience of most 
mandatory attendees for two reasons. 
First, requiring attendance implicitly emphasizes the value of simply 
showing up and “ignores contextual factors of the learning process, such 
                                                                                                             
 63. See, e.g., Barbara A. Bichelmeyer, Best Practices in Adult Education and 
E-Learning: Leverage Points for Quality and Impact of CLE, 40 VAL. U.L. REV. 
509, 515–16 (2006). 
 64. See, e.g., id. at 511–12; Bruce A. Green, Teaching Lawyers Ethics, 51 ST. 
LOUIS U. L.J. 1091, 1097 (2007); Murphy & Schwen, supra note 28, at 521–22; 
Segall, supra note 10, at 29.  
 65. See, e.g., Rhode & Ricca, supra note 7, at 8 (“Almost never do CLE 
programs provide the kind of environment that experts find conducive to adult 
learning, which involves preparation, participation, evaluation, accountability, and 
opportunities to apply new information in a practice setting.”); T. Brettel Dawson, 
Judicial Education: Pedagogy for a Change, 2015 J. DISP. RESOL. 175, 182 & n.29 
(2015); Quintin Johnstone, Bar Associations: Policies and Performance, 15 YALE 
L. & POL’Y REV. 193, 241 (1996). The quality of teaching provided by underpaid 
CLE instructors also may interfere with effective learning. See Elefant, supra note 
32 (observing that lack of instructor pay results in “less-qualified speakers eager for 
‘exposure,’ or speakers who will sell their firm or their product instead of imparting 
real value”). 
 66. See, e.g., Bichelmeyer, supra note 63, at 516–19 (suggesting that the 
inherent flexibility of courses provided through various distance learning 
platforms provides an opportunity to incorporate adult learning principles into 
CLE course offerings); Green, supra note 64 (proposing a problem method 
approach to CLE ethics offerings); Grigg, supra note 58 (proposing CLE 
programs that are adaptable, interactive, use hypotheticals, and are available in 
multiple settings); Harris, supra note 7, at 360 (proposing that CLE courses could 
better address a variety of learning styles).  
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as a person’s ability and willingness to learn.”67 Not surprisingly, then, 
observations abound of inattention during mandatory CLE courses as 
attendees do crossword puzzles, catch up on emails, or just sit politely 
through the session, waiting to be dismissed.68  
Second, courses that emphasize active learning and intensive contact 
between instructor and student require a substantial investment of money 
and/or time. For example, Professors Rhode and Ricca cited the original 
version of a training program developed by the Indiana Public Defender 
Council as a “model” of incorporating adult learning principles into 
mandatory CLE offerings.69 The program extended over 16 weeks and 
involved multiple meetings and intensive personal coaching on the 
participant’s actual cases.70 Subsequently, however, the Indiana program, 
which paid the instructors but was free to students, shrank from 16 weeks 
to 4 weeks and then became defunct.71 Although participating attorneys 
were enthusiastic about the experience, the multiple required meetings 
proved to be a logistical challenge, and the original outside funding for the 
program was not renewed.72 
Some mandatory CLE proponents argue that the system will right 
itself eventually; that is, the increase in attendees and oversight 
infrastructure that comes with a mandatory system eventually will increase 
the quality of the offerings.73 As is evident from four decades of mandatory 
CLE experience, however, the system does not produce high quality 
programs with lasting results. CLE courses certainly would benefit from 
                                                                                                             
 67. Graffy, supra note 27, at 1651; see also Green, supra note 64, at 1097; 
Murphy & Schwen, supra note 28, at 524; Rhode & Ricca, supra note 7, at 8; 
Thomas, supra note 27, at 14.  
 68. See, e.g., Graffy, supra note 27, at 1651; Mitchell, supra note 1, at 29; 
John M. Murtagh, Mandatory Continuing Legal Education: Against, ALASKA B. 
RAG, Mar.–Apr. 1998, at 14; Rhode & Ricca, supra note 7, at 8.  
 69. Rhode & Ricca, supra note 7, at 9 & n.87 (citing Murphy & Schwen, 
supra note 28, at 538). The Indiana training program was entitled, “Effective 
Representation of People Charged with Crimes Course.” See Murphy & Schwen, 
supra note 28, at 522 n.5. 
 70. Murphy & Schwen, supra note 28, at 534–38.  
 71. Telephone Interviews with Donald Murphy, Co-developer of the Indiana 
program (Jan. 24 & June 19, 2017) (notes on file with author).  
 72. Id. Mr. Murphy is hopeful that the four-week version of the program may 
yet be revived. Id. The Indiana Public Defender Council still offers a coaching 
program specifically focused on preparation for trial. Id. 
 73. See Rhode & Ricca, supra note 7, at 7 (describing but not endorsing this 
argument).  
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incorporating better models of adult learner engagement, but there is little 
incentive for improvement when attendance is mandatory.74 
II. STATUS QUO: VOLUNTARY PRO BONO 
The 1960s and 1970s witnessed a growing awareness of the power of 
the justice system to right many societal wrongs and the inability of 
indigent individuals to access that system effectively.75 The ABA debated 
imposing a mandatory pro bono obligation during this time but ultimately 
opted for a voluntary approach, citing attorney opposition.76 The voluntary 
system remains, apparently impervious to its failure to meet the ever-
expanding need for free legal services. 
A. The Unmet Need for Legal Services 
The rationale for pro bono service—whether voluntary or 
mandatory—starts with need. Estimates vary as to the number of persons 
who need but cannot afford legal representation—a problem commonly 
referred to as “the justice gap.”77 No credible estimation, however, would 
describe the gap as anything short of “vast.”78 
The continuing justice gap problem is reflected in the difficult 
circumstances facing the Legal Services Corporation (“LSC”), the nation’s 
                                                                                                             
 74. See id. at 9.  
 75. E.g., SHELDON KRANTZ, THE LEGAL PROFESSION: WHAT IS WRONG AND 
HOW TO FIX IT 73 (2013).  
 76. See Scott L. Cummings, The Politics of Pro Bono, 52 UCLA L. REV. 1, 
29–33 (2004) (outlining history of mandatory pro bono proposals within the 
ABA); April Faith-Slaker, What We Know and Need to Know About Pro Bono 
Service Delivery, 67 S.C. L. REV. 267, 280–81 (2016) (same). 
 77. E.g., The Unmet Need for Legal Aid, LEGAL SERVS. CORP., http://www 
.lsc.gov/what-legal-aid/unmet-need-legal-aid (last visited Sept. 30, 2017) (defining 
“justice gap” as the “difference between the level of civil legal assistance available 
and the level that is necessary to meet the legal needs of low-income individuals and 
families”) [https://perma.cc/M4HM-8ZY3]. Inadequate funding for and availability 
of free representation in criminal matters is also a longstanding problem of 
enormous magnitude. E.g., RHODE, supra note 33, at 30–35. This Article, however, 
concerns civil matters as pro bono efforts generally focus on matters in which the 
parties have no right to counsel. 
 78. See, e.g., Tonya L. Brito et al., What We Know and Need to Know About 
Civil Gideon, 67 S.C. L. REV. 223, 223 (2016); Justin Hansford, Lippman’s Law: 
Debating the Fifty-Hour Pro Bono Requirement for Bar Admission, 41 FORDHAM 
URBAN L.J. 1141, 1173 (2014).  
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largest civil legal aid funder, and its clients.79 Income eligibility for LSC 
services is capped at 125% of the federal poverty standard.80 An estimated 
20% of Americans meet this guideline at any given time and nearly 80% 
will experience significant economic hardship by age 60.81 Similarly bleak 
statistics are available from many sources.82  
Notwithstanding the enormity of these numbers, LSC has suffered deep 
funding cuts over the years,83 a trend likely to continue at an even greater 
pace under President Donald Trump.84 Even before the Trump presidency, 
50% of financially eligible individuals seeking LSC-funded representation 
were turned away because of insufficient resources, amounting to “nearly a 
                                                                                                             
 79. See Who We Are, LEGAL SERVS. CORP., http://www.lsc.gov/about-
lsc/who-we-are (last visited Sept. 30, 2017) [https://perma.cc/5NYZ-XP92]. LSC 
distributes funds for civil legal assistance to hundreds of legal aid offices. Id. 
 80. Id.  
 81. Kathryn Alfisi, Ensuring Justice for All: The White House Plan, WASH. 
LAW., May 2016, at 28 (citing figures provided by Lisa Foster, Director of the 
U.S. Department of Justice Office for Access to Justice).  
 82. See, e.g., ELIZABETH KNEEBONE, BROOKINGS, THE GREAT RECESSION AND 
POVERTY IN METROPOLITAN AMERICA 2 (2010), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-
content/uploads/2016/06/1007_suburban_poverty_acs_kneebone.pdf (“[T]he latest 
data from the Census Bureau’s 2009 American Community Survey (ACS) confirm 
that the worst U.S. economic downturn in decades exacerbated trends set in motion 
years before, by multiplying the ranks of America’s poor. Between 2007 and 2009, 
the national poverty rate rose from 13 percent to 14.3 percent, and the number of 
people below the poverty line jumped by 4.9 million.”) [https://perma.cc/F9CV-
VZ4W]; Poverty in the United States, How many people were poor in 2015?, NAT’L 
POVERTY CTR., UNIV. OF MICH., http://poverty.umich.edu/about/poverty-facts/us-
poverty/ (last visited Sept. 30, 2017) (“In 2015, 13.5% of all persons [in the United 
States] lived in poverty.”) [https://perma.cc/C4AF-HV5F].  
 83. See, e.g., Ronald S. Flagg, Access to Civil Justice: Keeping America’s 
Promise, 24 KAN. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 571, 574–77 (2015); Patricia E. Roberts, From 
the “War On Poverty” to Pro Bono: Access to Justice Remains Elusive for Too 
Many, Including Our Veterans, 34 B.C. J.L. & SOC. JUST. 341, 347–48 (2014). 
 84. From the beginning, President Trump has advocated for LSC’s complete 
elimination. See, e.g., Alexander Bolton, Trump Team Prepares Dramatic Cuts, 
HILL (Jan. 19, 2017, 6:00 AM), http://thehill.com/policy/finance/314991-trump-
team-prepares-dramatic-cuts (noting President Trump’s reliance on a Heritage 
Foundation budget-cutting proposal that would “eliminate” LSC) [https://per 
ma.cc/NRR8-N5MV]; Debra Cassens Weiss, Trump budget eliminates Legal 
Services Corp. funding, A.B.A. J. (Mar. 16, 2017, 8:45 AM), http://www.abajournal 
.com/news/article/trump_budget_eliminates_funding_for_legal_services_corp (de-
scribing President Trump’s first federal budget, which included no funds for LSC, 
and attorney opposition thereto) [https://perma.cc/LA2H-AD56]. 
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million” people every year.85 The “nearly a million” figure does not 
include the many individuals who need and are financially eligible for an 
LSC-funded attorney but do not request legal representation. This group 
includes individuals who assume that representation would be impossible 
to procure or do not realize that the legal system could redress their 
problems.86  
Decreased funding to LSC also has resulted in restrictions on the types 
of matters handled, with various LSC-funded programs responding to 
budgetary constraints by eliminating representation in certain types of 
family law, domestic violence, housing, and consumer law cases.87 These 
service cuts are in addition to politically motivated restrictions imposed by 
Congress, such as prohibitions on LSC-funded representation in class 
actions and representation of undocumented immigrants.88  
LSC representation cuts and restrictions have resulted in calls for other 
entities to “pick up the slack.”89 Many organizations have responded, 
including law firms and state bar Interest on Lawyer Trust Accounts 
(“IOLTA”) programs.90 Such efforts, however, do not make up the difference, 
and the justice gap remains stubbornly vast.91  
                                                                                                             
 85. See The Unmet Need for Legal Aid, supra note 77. 
 86. See Rebecca L. Sandefur, Bridging the Gap: Rethinking Outreach for 
Greater Access to Justice, 37 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 721, 725–27 (2015). 
 87. Flagg, supra note 83, at 578. 
 88. See, e.g., Jota Borgmann & Brian Sullivan, Demanding a Race to the Top: 
The 2015 Strike Against MFY Legal Services in Context, 19 CUNY L. REV. 195, 
203 (2016).  
 89. Jesse Newmark, Legal Aid Affairs: Collaborating With Local 
Governments on the Side, 21 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 195, 311–12 (2012). 
 90. See, e.g., Terry Carter, Expressing Their Interest, 93 A.B.A. J., June 2007, 
at 22, 23; Robert Granfield, Institutionalizing Public Service in Law School: 
Results On the Impact of Mandatory Pro Bono Programs, 54 BUFF. L. REV. 1355, 
1369–70 (2007). IOLTA programs operate in every state; in 2009, these programs 
generated more than $124.7 million for civil legal aid providers. What is IOLTA, 
IOLTA, http://www.iolta.org/what-is-iolta (last visited Sept. 30, 2017) 
[https://perma.cc/HLR9-DXF5]. 
 91. See BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, STRUGGLING TO MEET THE NEED: 
COMMUNITIES CONFRONT GAPS IN FEDERAL LEGAL AID 4 (2003) (“Although 
supporters of the cuts and restrictions said that state, local and private funding 
would pick up the slack [in legal-services funding], and although bar leaders and 
legal aid supporters find broad support for legal services in many parts of the 
country, the bottom line is that these expectations have been largely unfulfilled.”); 
LEGAL SERVS. CORP., RESOLUTION ADOPTING STRATEGIC DIRECTIONS FOR THE 
LEGAL SERVICES CORPORATION FOR 2000-2005, at 1 (2000) (noting that contributions 
by state and local governments, private parties, charities, and pro bono organizations 
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B. The Profession’s Insufficient Response 
The ABA’s model guidance to the profession always has incorporated 
an aspirational approach to pro bono obligations.92 As demonstrated 
below, that approach continues to be the norm throughout the United 
States, and insufficient pro bono participation is the result. 
1. The Rules 
In its current incarnation, ABA Model Rule 6.1 states that “[e]very lawyer 
has a professional responsibility to provide legal services to those unable to 
pay.”93 Fulfillment, however, remains voluntary: “A lawyer should aspire to 
render at least (50) hours of pro bono public legal services per year.”94 Thus, 
unlike failure to comply with the other rules of professional conduct, an 
attorney’s failure to fulfill her pro bono responsibilities is not punishable 
through the disciplinary process.95  
The aspirational nature of Rule 6.1 extends beyond the number of 
hours to the type of work encompassed under the “pro bono” label. The 
rule instructs that attorneys “should” fulfill “a substantial majority” of the 
50 hours by providing direct legal services to people who cannot afford 
representation or to organizations engaged in such work.96 But the hours 
also may be fulfilled in many other ways, including “participation in 
activities for improving the law, the legal system or the legal profession”—
                                                                                                             
“are not sufficient to meet the burden imposed by inadequate governmental 
investment”); David Luban, Optimism, Skepticism, and Access to Justice, 3 TEX. 
A&M L. REV. 495, 496 (2016) (“Of course, LSC is only part of the legal aid story, 
but other parts are no less grim.”). 
 92. See, e.g., Spencer Rand, A Poverty of Representation: The Attorney’s 
Role To Advocate for the Powerless, 13 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 545, 558–59 
(2007) (describing 1969 ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility, Ethical 
Consideration 2-25, which articulated attorneys’ “responsibility” for providing 
free representation but dictated only that attorneys “should” find time to discharge 
that responsibility); Faith-Slaker, supra note 76, at 280–81 (describing opposition 
to ABA consideration of mandatory pro bono proposals). 
 93. MODEL RULES r. 6.1.  
 94. Id. (emphasis added).  
 95. See id. cmt. 12. Even calling Rule 6.1 a “rule” is somewhat misleading as 
it is the only Model Rule that does not actually prohibit, permit, or require 
anything. See Lawrence J. Fox, Should We Mandate Doing Well By Doing Good?, 
33 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 249, 252–53 (2005). 
 96. MODEL RULES r. 6.1(a)(1)–(2). 
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a category that, depending on one’s perspective, may include almost 
anything.97 
Most states follow the ABA’s lead, with no state requiring any pro 
bono hours from its attorneys.98 About half of the states have adopted the 
ABA goal of 50 voluntary hours per year, with the remainder setting a 
lesser goal—generally, 20 to 30 hours per year—or making no specific 
recommendation regarding the number of hours.99 Moreover, all states 
with a pro bono rule follow the ABA’s broad latitude in encouraging direct 
services for indigent clients but allowing service through many other 
avenues as well.100  
2. The Results 
After almost 50 years of rules that encourage rather than require pro 
bono work, American attorneys do not come close to meeting the ABA’s 
Rule 6.1 aspirations.101  
Looking at pro bono reports provided by the ABA and state bar 
associations, however, one might conclude the opposite. The ABA in 
particular touts what seem like unrealistically high levels of pro bono 
                                                                                                             
 97. See MODEL RULES r. 6.1(b)(3); see also Rand, supra note 92, at 558 
(“[A]n attorney representing a wealthy suburban athletic league could easily 
decide that he was meeting his pro bono obligation [under Rule 6.1].”). 
 98. Though no hours are required by New Jersey’s version of Rule 6.1, see 
N.J. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 6.1, New Jersey does have a statewide pro 
bono court appointment system that comes closer to requiring some degree of pro 
bono than any other statewide system, see infra notes 177–182 and accompanying 
text. At the other end of the spectrum, several states have no pro bono rule at all. 
See, e.g., ILL. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, Preamble (noting that the absence of 
an Illinois version of Model Rule 6.1 is not intended to limit attorneys’ pro bono 
responsibilities; rather, “this responsibility is not appropriate for disciplinary 
rules”); OHIO RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r . 6.1 (noting that the Supreme Court 
of Ohio has deferred consideration of Model Rule 6.1). 
 99. See, e.g., IOWA RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 32:6:1 (2013) (50 hours); 
MISS. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 6.1(b) (20 hours); NEB. RULES OF PROF’L 
CONDUCT r. 3-506.1 (no specific number of hours). 
 100. By way of example, a broad “pro bono” definition can be found in any of 
the rules cited in the immediately preceding footnote.  
 101.  See, e.g., Lisa H. Nicholson, Access to Justice Requires Access to 
Attorneys: Restrictions on the Practice of Law Serve a Societal Purpose, 82 
FORDHAM L. REV. 2761, 2785 (2014) (noting the lack of sufficient “voluntary 
movement” to meet the 50-hour goal); Deborah L. Rhode, Squeezing the Public 
Good, A.B.A. J., Nov. 2000, at 120, 120 (“Most practitioners make no pro bono 
contributions to the poor.”). 
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participation.102 One ABA study, for example, found that 89% of survey 
respondents performed at least one pro bono hour in 2011103 and summed 
up its “key findings” as follows: “The results of this study reflect American 
lawyers’ continued awareness of pro bono as a professional responsibility 
and their strong ongoing commitment to volunteering their legal services to 
meet the legal needs of the poor.”104  
Certainly, thousands of attorneys do their part and more. This same 
ABA study, for example, found that responding attorneys provided an 
average of 56.5 pro bono hours in 2011; when attorneys who reported zero 
pro bono hours were removed from the calculation, the average 
contribution rose to 70.91 hours.105  
This impressive snapshot, however, is belied by the voluntary survey 
nature of the study.106 Of the 379,755 attorneys receiving questionnaires, 
2,876—approximately three-quarters of one percent—responded.107 The 
ABA stated that this response rate was “consistent with industry 
expectations for a study of this nature,”108 but it seems unlikely that 
attorneys who provided few or no pro bono hours would be inclined to 
complete the survey.109 By contrast, a Virginia report that collected data 
from pro bono provider organizations in the state, rather than relying on 
individual attorney survey responses, suggests a less impressive picture.110 
The Virginia report concluded that only nine percent of Virginia attorneys 
participated in organized pro bono programs.111 Even factoring in the 
                                                                                                             
 102. See Rand, supra note 92, at 557 (describing ABA pro bono statistics as 
“straining credibility”). 
 103. See A.B.A. STANDING COMM. ON PRO BONO AND PUB. SERV., 
SUPPORTING JUSTICE III: A REPORT ON THE PRO BONO WORK OF AMERICA’S 
LAWYERS 9 (2013) [hereinafter SUPPORTING JUSTICE III].  
 104. Id. at vi. 
 105. Id. at vi & n.4. 
 106. See Luban, supra note 91, at 496–97. 
 107. See SUPPORTING JUSTICE III, supra note 103, at 2.  
 108. Id. 
 109. The ABA acknowledged this “possible” bias but concluded that “[i]t is 
also possible that those who are particularly interested in the issue—both 
supportive and unsupportive of pro bono—are more likely to self-select into the 
survey,” thus skewing the findings “not in favor of pro bono, but rather in favor 
of polarized views on this topic.” Id. at A-2. This Article leaves it to others to 
evaluate the soundness of these various “possibilities,” but it seems unlikely that 
the radically polarized survey respondents hypothesized by the ABA cancel out 
the bias toward respondents who are pro bono participants.  
 110. See Joanna L. Suyes & John Whitfield, Is There a Pro Bono Gap in 
Virginia?, VIRGINIA LAW., Feb. 2014, at 46. 
 111. See id. at 47. 
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likely number of pro bono hours provided outside of organized programs, 
the report projected that lawyers in the state provided only about eight 
percent of the pro bono hours envisioned by Rule 6.1.112  
Survey results also vary considerably with how respondents define 
“pro bono.” Some survey respondents may count as “pro bono” almost any 
unpaid activity, including services provided to non-indigent friends or 
family.113 Not surprisingly, the closer a survey’s “pro bono” definition hews 
to the provision of direct legal services to individuals meeting LSC’s income 
restrictions, the lower the number of reported pro bono participants.114 For 
example, a Nebraska survey employing a strict definition found that 
approximately 58% of respondents had contributed at least one pro bono 
hour in 2014.115 The much lower percentage of participating Nebraska 
attorneys as compared to the ABA survey’s 89% probably reflected 
Nebraska’s “more detailed and specific definition of pro bono.”116 And, of 
course, even Nebraska’s 58% pro bono participation rate still reflects the 
mere 14% of attorneys who responded at all.117  
Looking to minimize the confusion caused by the various methods and 
definitions employed in these and similar surveys, Professor Rhode 
examined a cross section of state-specific data and estimated that 15 to 
18% of attorneys in most jurisdictions participate in pro bono work to 
some extent and that average per-attorney contributions ranged from 5 to 
20 hours per year.118 Extrapolating from more recent law firm data, 
Sheldon Krantz estimated a national average of between three and six pro 
bono hours per attorney per year.119  
                                                                                                             
 112. See id. at 48.  
 113. See Rand, supra note 92, at 557–58. 
 114. See APRIL FAITH-SLAKER, LEGAL AID OF NEB., SUPPORTING JUSTICE IN 
NEBRASKA: A REPORT ON THE PRO BONO WORK OF NEBRASKA’S LAWYERS 13 
(2015) (“[W]hen not restricted to an objective definition, attorneys’ subjective 
definitions of pro bono might be more expansive.”). 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. Even in the ABA survey, the percentage of respondents who reported 
at least one pro bono hour fell nine points when the “pro bono” definition 
excluded, among other activities, “law-related” services provided at reduced cost 
to organizations “that support[] legal services for . . . the general public.” See 
SUPPORTING JUSTICE III, supra note 103, at 3–5, 9. 
 117. See FAITH-SLAKER, supra note 114, at 11.  
 118. RHODE, supra note 6, at 327–28. This estimate of average hours per 
attorney factored in those attorneys who do no pro bono work at all. See id.  
 119. See KRANTZ, supra note 75, at 80. Krantz relied on data finding that only 
44% of attorneys in the nation’s largest law firms—who likely contribute a “sizeable” 
share of total pro bono hours—performed even 20 hours per year. Id. at 79–80.  
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Acknowledging, if tacitly, that the documented level of pro bono service 
demonstrates much room for improvement, the profession has focused on 
“mobilizing, leveraging, and targeting” more volunteer attorneys.120 For 
example, bar associations and other non-profit organizations have 
implemented extensive pro bono outreach and training programs, with 
certificates and awards to recognize and incentivize pro bono service.121 
Although decades of such initiatives undoubtedly have contributed to the 
pro bono pool, little evidence shows that such programs affect long-term 
increases in pro bono participation rates.122 
A more ambitious incentive implemented in nine states requires 
attorneys to report the extent of their pro bono work on an annual basis, 
even if the report simply states that the attorney did no pro bono work that 
year.123 Mandatory reporting both reminds attorneys of the expectation 
imposed by Rule 6.1 and incorporates a shaming element, assuming that 
attorneys will not want to report zero pro bono hours.124  
In 2013, pro bono participation in the nine mandatory reporting states 
ranged from 33% of attorneys in Nevada to 57% in New Mexico.125 The 
average number of hours per attorney in these states ranged from 15 hours 
in Mississippi to 47 hours in Nevada.126 These numbers are fairly high, 
and it seems logical that mandatory reporting might at least nudge 
participation rates and hours upward. No reliable basis of comparison to 
                                                                                                             
 120. Scott L. Cummings & Rebecca L. Sandefur, Beyond the Numbers: What 
We Know—And Should Know—About American Pro Bono, 7 HARV. L. & POL’Y 
REV. 83, 84 (2013); see also RHODE, supra note 6, at 72 (“Unless and until we 
can build a broader base of support for obligations that substantially benefit the 
most underserved groups, the prudent alternative would be to focus on 
strengthening voluntary initiatives . . . .”). 
 121. See, e.g., Ann Juergens & Diane Galatowitsch, A Call to Cultivate the 
Public Interest: Beyond Pro Bono, 51 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 95, 109 (2016). 
 122. See, e.g., Cummings & Sandefur, supra note 120, at 94–95 (finding that far 
more significant to pro bono behavior are workplace factors, such as attorneys 
feeling financially comfortable enough to take the time to volunteer their services). 
 123. Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Maryland, Mississippi, Nevada, New 
Mexico, and New York require pro bono reporting. Pro Bono Reporting, AM. BAR 
ASS’N, http://www.americanbar.org/groups/probono_public_service/ts/pbreporting 
.html (last visited Sept. 30, 2017) [https://perma.cc/EP3E-RAB2]. Thirteen additional 
states provide a vehicle for attorneys to voluntarily report their pro bono work. See id.  
 124. See RHODE, supra note 6, at 167–68. Mandatory reporting also provides a 
source of data presumably more reliable than voluntary response surveys. See id. 
 125. The most recent data available from the ABA is from 2013. See Pro Bono 
Reporting, supra note 123. 
 126. These calculations included the attorneys who provided zero pro bono 
hours. See id.  
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states without such a requirement exists, however, and studies conducted 
thus far have yet to establish a positive effect from mandatory reporting.127 
C. A Mandatory Pro Bono Obligation  
The inadequacy of voluntary pro bono efforts logically leads to the 
consideration of a mandatory system. At least conceptually, mandatory 
pro bono is justified by “unauthorized practice of law” (“UPL”) 
restrictions that both privilege the legal profession and exacerbate the need 
for free legal services.128  
Like anyone else with a legal problem, an indigent person is far more 
likely to win her case—to avoid eviction from her home, avoid losing custody 
of her children, avoid deportation, and so on—if she is represented.129 With 
few exceptions, however, UPL restrictions limit representation in such 
matters to licensed attorneys.130 The bar has made a priority of preserving 
such restrictions.131 
                                                                                                             
 127. See Cummings & Sandefur, supra note 120, at 94 n.37 (noting that 
although Florida reported substantially increased pro bono rates after instituting 
mandatory reporting, many other factors may have influenced the increase); 
Rebecca L. Sandefur, Lawyers’ Pro Bono Service and American-Style Civil Legal 
Assistance, 41 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 79, 100 (2007) (finding no relationship 
between state reporting requirements and rates of pro bono participation). 
 128. See, e.g., Fox, supra note 95, at 252 (“[I]f we lawyers want to maintain 
our monopoly on legal services, we clearly have an obligation individually to meet 
the legal needs of the poor.”); Lininger, supra note 6, at 1343.  
 129. See, e.g., Rebecca L. Sandefur, Elements of Professional Expertise: 
Understanding Relational and Substantive Expertise through Lawyers’ Impact, 80 
AM. SOC. REV. 909, 924 (2015) (finding “spectacular” outcome differences between 
legal matters handled by an attorney and legal matters handled on a pro se basis).  
 130. The ABA collects and describes the various states’ UPL provisions. See 
Task Force on the Model Definition of the Practice of Law, AM. BAR ASS’N, 
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/task_force_model 
_definition_practice_law.html (last visited Sept. 30, 2017) [https://perma.cc/M44U-
98E6]. UPL restrictions may be ripe for legal challenge in the wake of the Supreme 
Court’s 2015 decision that the Federal Trade Commission could hold a state board 
of dental examiners accountable for its anticompetitive efforts to drive non-dentist 
teeth whitening practitioners out of the state. See N. C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’ers 
v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 1101 (2015). UPL restrictions, however, have 
resisted such challenges before as seen in the wake of a 1970s flurry of antitrust 
enforcement efforts against the organized bar, which eventually gave way to today’s 
vigorously enforced UPL rules. Cf. Anya E.R. Prince & Arlene M. Davis, Navigating 
Professional Norms in an Inter-Professional Environment: The “practice” of 
Healthcare Ethics Committees, 15 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 115, 140 (2016).  
 131. See, e.g., Johnstone, supra note 65, at 218–20; Lininger, supra note 6, at 1347. 
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UPL restrictions protect attorneys from competition and often may 
protect clients, but they also limit the pool of competent individuals 
available to represent indigent persons without violating the law 
themselves.132 Professor Rhode explains the “straightforward” justification 
for mandatory pro bono under these market conditions: “Because access to 
law so often requires access to lawyers, they bear a particular responsibility 
to help make legal services available. As courts and bar ethical codes have 
long noted, the state grants lawyers special monopoly privileges that 
impose special obligations” for “fundamental fairness” in the legal 
system.133 
Mandatory pro bono opponents protest that the legal profession is not 
particularly responsible for poverty and that attorneys, therefore, are not 
particularly responsible for solving the poverty-driven justice gap.134 
Responsibility for circumstances underlying the gap of course extends well 
beyond attorneys. But this acknowledgement does not obviate attorneys’ 
obligation to provide assistance when—because of UPL restrictions—no 
other individuals are permitted to do so and when the limitation on supply 
so directly benefits the group—attorneys—who are called upon to help. 
Beyond the complaint that attorneys should not be singled out for 
service, mandatory pro bono opponents advance a host of other 
objections.135 Some of the most common objections are outlined below, and 
all of them raise important considerations suggesting a cautious path 
forward. None, however, establish a significant enough concern to derail the 
mandatory concept.  
                                                                                                             
 132. See Selina Thomas, Rethinking Unauthorized Practice of Law in Light of 
the Access to Justice Crisis, 23 PROF. LAW. 17 (2016). 
 133. RHODE, supra note 33, at 54; see also Michael Millemann, Mandatory 
Pro Bono in Civil Cases: A Partial Answer to the Right Question, 49 MD. L. REV. 
18, 69 (1990). In earlier writings, Professor Rhode stopped short of endorsing a 
broad pro bono requirement, a choice criticized as inconsistent with her evaluation 
of the inadequacies of voluntary pro bono. See Lininger, supra note 6, at 1353–
55. Rhode’s more recent work evinces a change of position. See RHODE, supra 
note 33, at 54 (advocating a 50 hour-per-year pro bono requirement).  
 134. See, e.g., Rob Atkinson, A Social-Democratic Critique of Pro Bono Publico 
Representation of the Poor: The Good as the Enemy of the Best, 9 AM. U. J. GENDER 
SOC. POL’Y & L. 129, 152–54 (2001); Michael A. Mogill, Professing Pro Bono: To 
Walk the Talk, 15 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 5, 22 (2001). 
 135. See, e.g., Kellie Isbell & Sarah Sawle, Pro Bono Publico: Voluntary 
Service and Mandatory Reporting, 15 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 845, 850–52 (2002).  
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1. Constitutionality 
Justice Sonia Sotomayor’s recent comment that she believes in “forced 
labor” for pro bono obligations brought a flurry of criticism, including the 
argument that mandatory pro bono would violate the Thirteenth 
Amendment’s prohibition on “involuntary servitude.”136 Other 
constitutional arguments against mandatory pro bono include the First 
Amendment’s prohibition on forced association, the Fifth Amendment’s 
prohibition on uncompensated takings, and the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
equal protection guarantee.137  
No state employs a mandatory pro bono scheme, so these constitutional 
theories have yet to be tested directly. Similar arguments, however, have 
been widely rejected in analogous contexts, including cases in which 
attorneys have challenged uncompensated court appointments.138 
Mandatory pro bono requirements might be found unconstitutional even if 
court appointments are not.139 The current legal landscape, however, 
                                                                                                             
 136. See supra note 3 and accompanying text; Ilya Somin, Justice Sotomayor’s 
Misguided Advocacy of “Forced Labor” for Lawyers [Updated With a Response 
to Steve Lubet], WASH. POST (May 20, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com 
/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2016/05/20/justice-sotomayors-misguided-advocacy-
of-forced-labor-for-lawyers/?utm_term=.6c544914d86d [https://perma.cc/KD3J-S 
FCK]. 
 137. See, e.g., Reed Elizabeth Loder, Tending The Generous Heart: Mandatory 
Pro Bono and Moral Development, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 459, 464–65 (2001).  
 138. See, e.g., Family Div. Trial Lawyers of Superior Court, Inc. v. Moultrie, 725 
F.2d 695, 704–07 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (rejecting involuntary servitude and takings 
arguments, though noting that particularly burdensome appointments could be 
unconstitutional takings if they deprived attorneys of the ability to make a living); 
Madden v. Twp. of Delran, 601 A.2d 211, 215–16 (N.J. 1992) (rejecting takings 
argument against municipal court assignments system). See generally Roger C. 
Cramton, Mandatory Pro Bono, 19 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1113, 1131–32 (1991); 
Lininger, supra note 6, at 1357; Millemann, supra note 133, at 49–55. In the one 
reported challenge to required pro bono reporting, see supra notes 123–127 and 
accompanying text, the Eleventh Circuit rejected the plaintiffs’ due process and equal 
protection arguments. See Schwartz v. Kogan, 132 F.3d 1387, 1392 (11th Cir. 1998). 
 139. See John C. Scully, Mandatory Pro Bono: An Attack on the Constitution, 
19 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1229, 1243 (1991) (arguing that mandatory pro bono would 
lack the “careful balancing of interests” that might justify court appointment in a 
particular matter). But see Cramton, supra note 138, at 1132 (“A mandatory pro 
bono program requiring 20 hours a year of work for poor clients in civil matters 
raises fewer constitutional questions than does the court appointment practice.”). 
2017] MAKING CLE VOLUNTARY AND PRO BONO MANDATORY 575 
 
 
 
provides little reason to believe that such a reversal of course is imminent or 
likely.140 
2. Misdirected Resources 
Some mandatory pro bono opponents argue that the substantial energy 
and resources required to enact, implement, and administer mandatory 
measures would be better directed toward fighting for the superior 
solution: increased government funding for LSC and other professional 
civil legal aid providers.141  
This argument begins with the clearly correct proposition that 
professional legal aid attorneys generally provide the best legal aid 
representation. The argument falters, however, with the assumption that 
moving from voluntary to mandatory measures would leech energy and 
funding from that goal. Decades of voluntary pro bono have seen nothing 
but decreased funding for LSC and similar organizations.142 Although 
moving to a mandatory system might accelerate LSC’s funding decline at 
an even more alarming rate, it cannot be said that remaining in a voluntary 
system is likely to bring improved resources to professional legal aid 
providers. 
Indeed, if, as seems certain, mandatory pro bono measures would be 
unpopular among various segments of the attorney population, such 
resistance might actually spark a drive for increased legal aid funding. Such 
funding might come from local governments, as happened when the Chief 
Justice of the New Jersey Supreme Court ordered pro bono appointments to 
represent indigent sex offenders challenging their obligation to register with 
local police. Attorney pushback was swift and vociferous and resulted in the 
governor allocating new funds to hire additional public defenders to handle 
                                                                                                             
 140. See Somin, supra note 136 (arguing that although mandatory pro bono 
should be considered unconstitutional, “such a program might well be permissible 
under existing Supreme Court precedent”).   
 141. See, e.g., Atkinson, supra note 134, at 131 (arguing that a push for 
mandatory pro bono would put increased funding for professional legal services 
“farther out of reach”); Samuel R. Bagenstos, Mandatory Pro Bono and Private 
Attorneys General, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1459, 1467 (2007) (arguing that 
mandatory pro bono “will likely make it harder to obtain political support” for 
increased legal services funding); Esther F. Lardent, Mandatory Pro Bono in Civil 
Cases: The Wrong Answer to the Right Question, 49 MD. L. REV. 78, 99–100 
(1990) (arguing that the substantial funds necessary for mandatory program 
administration would be better spent on client services). 
 142. See supra notes 83–84 and accompanying text. 
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these cases.143 Additional funding also might come from attorneys 
themselves, as mandatory pro bono measures likely would come with a 
buy-out option for attorneys who are unable or unwilling to provide direct 
services in any given year, with proceeds going to legal aid providers.144 
3. Second-Rate Representation  
Another related argument against mandatory pro bono is that the 
quality of conscripted representation by resentful attorneys will be 
especially low.145 Some attorneys may work less diligently on unpaid 
matters, and pro bono clients may be less likely to take action against 
inattentive or otherwise incompetent counsel.146 Competence, however, is 
no less an obligation in pro bono representation than it is in paid 
representation, and the vast majority of attorneys will provide competent 
legal representation, at the very least to protect their bar licenses and 
reputations.147  
4. Current Volunteers  
Yet another objection to mandatory pro bono concerns the potentially 
negative impact on current pro bono volunteers. Mandating pro bono for 
all attorneys might diminish the enthusiasm and commitment of current 
participants—precisely those attorneys who might serve as models and 
                                                                                                             
 143. See Michael P. Ambrosio & Denis F. Mclaughlin, The Redefining of 
Professional Ethics in New Jersey Under Chief Justice Robert Wilentz: A Legacy 
of Reform, 7 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 351, 409–10 (1997). 
 144. The current version of Model Rule 6.1 allows attorneys unable to fulfill the 
recommended 50 voluntary hours per year to “discharge the pro bono responsibility 
by providing financial support to organizations providing free legal services to 
persons of limited means” in an amount “reasonably equivalent to the value of the 
hours of service that would have otherwise been provided.” MODEL RULES r. 6.1 
cmt. 9. A similar buy-out provision presumably would be seen as even more 
necessary in a mandatory system. See, e.g., Quintin Johnstone, Law and Policy 
Issues Concerning the Provision of Adequate Legal Services for the Poor, 20 
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 571, 607 (2011) (arguing for a mandatory system with 
a buy-out option equivalent to legal aid attorneys’ average two-week salary). 
 145. See, e.g., Somin, supra note 136. 
 146. See Barbara Graves-Poller, Is Pro Bono Practice in Legal “Backwaters” 
Beyond the Scope of the Model Rules?, 13 U.N.H. L. REV. 1, 4–5, 24 (2015). 
 147. Competence is required of all attorneys in all matters. See MODEL RULES r. 
1.1; see also Ann Fenton, The Pro Bono Paradox, DRI FOR DEF., March 2011, at 
75 (“Lawyers should provide pro bono services, [but] must do so competently.”). 
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mentors for those new to pro bono work.148 Such a mandate might even 
cause current volunteers to decrease their hours to the bare minimum 
requirement.149 Any mandatory scheme should incorporate formal 
recognition and other incentives for volunteers who remain willing to 
exceed minimum expectations. 
5. Insufficient Response  
Finally, many have observed that requiring every attorney to 
contribute 50 or more pro bono hours per year still would not close the 
justice gap.150 Rather than undermining the case for a mandatory system, 
however, this argument underscores the need for multi-faceted solutions. 
In addition to increased funding for LSC and similar organizations, such 
solutions could include less-restrictive UPL regulations, allowing non-
attorneys to provide certain legal services,151 and “low-bono” initiatives, 
allowing greater access to representation for clients who cannot afford 
market-rate attorneys but earn too much to qualify for LSC services.152  
                                                                                                             
 148. See, e.g., Loder, supra note 137, at 474 (discussing potential “undermining 
effect” on current volunteers). 
 149. Id. at 477–78.  
 150. See, e.g., Granfield, supra note 90, at 1410 (finding it “extremely 
doubtful” that private pro bono “will ever adequately provide for the legal needs 
of the poor”); Gillian K. Hadfield, Higher Demand, Lower Supply? A 
Comparative Assessment of the Legal Resource Landscape for Ordinary 
Americans, 37 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 129, 152 (2010) (“[E]ven if every lawyer in 
the country did 100 more hours a year of pro bono work, this would amount to an 
extra thirty minutes per U.S. person a year, or about an hour per dispute-related 
(potentially litigation-related) problem per household.”). 
 151. See, e.g., Lininger, supra note 6, at 1364 (arguing that, if efforts to 
increase pro bono are insufficient, “state legislatures should begin to roll back the 
legal monopoly that is responsible for the inaccessibility of legal services”); 
Sandefur, supra note 12, at 910 (finding that non-attorney representatives can 
have a “powerful impact” in many “civil matters that can lead to bankruptcy, 
penury, homelessness, and lost custody”); Thomas, supra note 132, at 22 
(encouraging reassessment of UPL restrictions in light of “the public’s need for 
access to the civil justice system and the public’s right to have meaningful choices 
in civil legal representation”). A related initiative might support increased 
resources to promote effective pro se representation. See, e.g., Deborah J. 
Cantrell, Justice for Interests of the Poor: The Problem of Navigating the System 
Without Counsel, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 1573, 1581 (2002).  
 152. See Hadfield, supra note 150, at 148 (documenting “average” households’ 
lack of access to legal services). 
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Although requiring mandatory pro bono hours is not a complete 
solution, the requirement would mean that many more indigent individuals 
would have access to sorely needed legal representation.153 To accept the 
voluntary pro bono status quo is to forego an enormous potential resource.  
III. RETHINKING THE STATUS QUO 
Mandatory CLE does not serve its purpose of increasing attorney 
competence. Voluntary pro bono does not come close to meeting the 
public need created, in part, by monopolistic UPL restrictions. These 
observations lead to more than one potential conclusion, including simply 
eliminating mandatory CLE. But the possibility of trading an unjustified 
requirement for one with promise should be explored and leveraged.  
A. Counting Pro Bono Hours Toward CLE Requirements 
One currently promoted alternative implicitly recognizes the potential 
for a status quo shift. Beginning with Wyoming in 2003, 11 states now 
allow attorneys to count a small number of qualifying pro bono hours 
toward mandatory CLE requirements.154 This arrangement is justified both 
as providing a significant learning experience for the attorney, thus fitting 
within mandatory CLE’s educational mandate, and as encouraging 
additional pro bono work, thus making a dent in the justice gap not filled 
through traditional pro bono incentives.155  
                                                                                                             
 153. See, e.g., Tom Lininger, Volition and Voltaire: A Response to Professor 
Bagenstos, 101 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 192, 194 (2007) (“Hoping for a surge 
in voluntary pro bono work (which I’ll admit would be the perfect solution) could 
delay the improvement that a mandatory regime could bring.”); Steven Wechsler, 
Attorneys’ Attitudes Toward Mandatory Pro Bono, 41 SYRACUSE L. REV. 909, 
924 (1990) (“Perhaps the single most compelling argument in favor of making 
pro bono service mandatory is the tremendous unmet legal needs of the poor in 
our society and the fact that mandatory pro bono appears to be one of the most 
viable ways for beginning to meet those needs.”). 
 154. The 11 states are Arizona, Colorado, Delaware, Louisiana, Minnesota, 
New York, North Dakota, Ohio, Tennessee, Washington, and Wyoming. CLE 
Rules, AM. BAR ASS’N, http://www.americanbar.org/groups/probono_public 
_service/policy/cle_rules.html (last updated Oct. 2017) [https://perma.cc/Q46B-
TX2A]. 
 155. See John Caher, State Board Adopts CLE Rules Allowing for Pro Bono 
Credit, N.Y.L.J., Mar. 6, 2000, at 1; Melissa H. Weresh, Service: A Prescription 
for the Lost Lawyer, 2014 J. PROF. LAW. 45, 77–78 (2014); Jason B. Wesoky, 
Credit Where Credit Is Due, COLO. LAW., Aug. 2012, at 115. 
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The impact of this seemingly win-win arrangement on pro bono 
service has yet to be determined. As a large-scale solution, however, it 
presents problems both in practice and in theory. As a practical matter, 
state rules protect the profitable mandatory CLE industry. Although the 
rules vary somewhat among the 11 states, most allow three or fewer yearly 
mandatory CLE credit hours to be fulfilled by pro bono work, and most 
require 15 hours of pro bono work to earn those three hours of CLE 
credit.156 Although the nod to pro bono work is undoubtedly a welcome 
gesture,157 the math undermines its value as a pro bono incentive.  
One option is to change the math, allowing attorneys to fully discharge 
their mandatory CLE obligations through pro bono hours and allowing one 
pro bono hour to count for one mandatory CLE hour.158 The typical 10 to 
15 mandatory CLE hours required in most states might not encourage the 
most meaningful pro bono contributions, but that problem could be 
alleviated somewhat if participants could discharge, say, 45 hours once 
every three years rather than 15 hours every year. 
A more fundamental issue, however, is that CLE and pro bono work 
are intended to serve different purposes.159 If completing the full complement 
of mandatory CLE hours does not enhance attorney competence, then such 
hours should not be required. If, on the other hand, more pro bono service is 
needed, then the bar should consider making pro bono mandatory without 
tying the hours to an ill-fitting mandatory CLE structure.  
B. A Full Switch Is Premature 
Although counting pro bono hours toward CLE requirements is an 
unsatisfying solution, substantial reasons still favor a limited approach 
rather than a full-scale switch to voluntary CLE and mandatory pro bono. 
First, opposition on both fronts would be formidable and probably 
insurmountable. Second, although the absence of data justifies eliminating 
mandatory CLE, far better data is needed regarding mandatory pro bono 
before it could be justified as an effective approach to addressing the 
justice gap.  
                                                                                                             
 156. See Weresh, supra note 155, at 77–78. 
 157. See Rhode & Ricca, supra note 7, at 10 (noting popularity of such 
programs notwithstanding their limitations, especially among attorneys who view 
mandatory CLE as “mindless busywork”). 
 158. See Lininger, supra note 6, at 1363. 
 159. See Christopher D. Bryan, Why Lawyers Should Just Say No, COLO. 
LAW., Aug. 2012, at 115; Shepard, supra note 11, at 322–23. 
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1. Political Impossibility 
As a practical matter, a status quo switch is politically impossible at 
this juncture. From the CLE side, Michigan is the only state to have 
rescinded a CLE requirement, and that requirement was limited to ten 
hours per year for the first three years of bar admission with courses 
provided by the state bar association for free.160 The hope was that 
Michigan attorneys would develop an appreciation for CLE and would 
voluntarily pay for CLE courses after the three-year mandatory CLE period 
expired.161 That hope did not materialize, and new Michigan attorneys 
resented mandatory attendance at the admittedly sub-par offerings.162 Thus, 
the program was of no financial value to providers, and its elimination in 
1994, five years after adoption, was accomplished apparently with little 
resistance.163 Eliminating mandatory CLE in other jurisdictions—where 
courses, for the most part, are not free and where the requirement extends 
throughout attorneys’ professional lives—would undoubtedly meet fierce 
resistance from bar associations and other providers. 
From the pro bono side, imposing a new requirement would also 
encounter widespread resistance. As observed by Professor David Luban, 
“[M]andatory proposals have always met with hostility, and in my view 
the prospects for mandatory pro bono are so dim that it is a waste of time 
to continue talking about it.”164 In addition to the anti-mandatory 
                                                                                                             
 160. See Michael Franck, Michigan’s MCLE—An Idea Whose Time Has Not 
Yet Come?, 72 MICH. B.J. 1132, 1132 (1993). 
 161. Id. 
 162. Id. 
 163. See Davison, Farmer & Kane, supra note 1, at 10 (“The [Michigan] 
experiment was widely viewed as a disaster.”); Cynthia McLoughlin, Michigan 
Lawyers Reject Mandatory Continuing Legislation, MICH. SOC’Y FOR 
PSYCHOANALYTIC PSYCHOL. (Oct. 2002), http://www.mspp.net/mcloughlin2.htm 
(“[The Michigan rule] was universally detested by the young lawyers (who found 
the requirements irrelevant to their professional educational needs), and no one 
else liked it, either.”) [https://perma.cc/8548-V6EJ]; TASK FORCE ON 
CONTINUING LEGAL EDUC., supra note 44, at 26–27, 27 n.11 (“The Michigan 
Bar’s recommendation to rescind the rule was based on . . . its conclusion that the 
MCLE system . . . was not achieving its intended result of ensuring that attorneys 
newly admitted to the practice of law acquire the values and skills that are 
necessary to discharge their professional duties . . . . Course evaluations and 
comments from new attorneys about the MCLE system were overwhelmingly 
negative.”).  
 164. David Luban, Faculty Pro Bono and the Question of Identity, 49 J. LEGAL 
EDUC. 58, 58 (1999); see also Lardent, supra note 141, at 78–79 (noting the 
“ultimate futility” of mandatory pro bono proposals given “political realities”).  
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arguments discussed above,165 attorneys as a practical matter are unlikely 
to support imposing a new obligation on themselves. The resistance might 
be particularly fierce—and understandably so—from attorneys practicing 
in settings with fewer resources to absorb the cost of the added obligation. 
Removing the CLE requirement at the same time might blunt some of the 
opposition. Effective pro bono, however, probably requires more hours 
than are currently imposed by CLE requirements.166 Just as the relative 
burden from mandatory CLE is greater for solo practitioners and other 
attorneys with fewer resources,167 so too would be the pro bono burden.  
2. Dearth of Mandatory Pro Bono Experience 
 In addition to the political hurdles, adding a broad pro bono 
requirement would be unjustified from an evidentiary perspective. At this 
point, scholars’ understanding of even voluntary pro bono efforts is 
limited. Sociologist Rebecca Sandefur and others have identified the 
urgent need for better research in the pro bono arena.168 For example, what 
types of pro bono training and oversight are most useful for attorneys who 
come from a variety of backgrounds? Are certain types of legal matters 
more amenable than others to pro bono representation? How many hours 
are required realistically for effective representation in different types of 
matters?169 
As little as is known about the efficacy of voluntary pro bono models, 
even less is understood about mandatory models because, as discussed 
below, so few jurisdictions have experimented with mandatory programs. 
Data is needed to discern, for example, the extent to which mandatory 
programs increase the net number of pro bono hours and whether they 
improve the quality of pro bono representation. Without such data, the two 
                                                                                                             
 165. See supra notes 134–151 and accompanying text. 
 166. See, e.g., Milan Markovic, Juking Access to Justice to Deregulate the 
Legal Market, 29 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 63, 87 (2016) (observing that even 30 
hours of pro bono service is “insufficient to resolve all but uncomplicated 
matters”).  
 167. See supra notes 31–32 and accompanying text. 
 168. See Catherine R. Albiston & Rebecca L. Sandefur, Expanding the 
Empirical Study of Access to Justice, 2013 WISC. L. REV. 101, 103–04 (2013); 
Cummings & Sandefur, supra note 120, at 103–05; Sandefur, supra note 129, at 
927; see also Faith-Slaker, supra note 76, at 284 (“Without more information, . . 
. programs and policies meant to increase pro bono participation and ultimately 
provide better access to justice for the impoverished population rest on little more 
than speculation.”). 
 169. The authorities referenced in the immediately preceding footnote raise 
these questions, among others. 
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sides to the mandatory debate can continue their arguments only in the 
hypothetical realm.170  
Various bar association committees occasionally have proposed 
mandatory programs, but almost none have been implemented.171 One 
“renegade jurisdiction” that did adopt such a mandate is Orange County, 
Florida.172 The Orange County Bar Association requires all members to 
accept two Legal Aid case referrals per year, contribute $350 to Legal Aid, 
or participate in an alternative approved project.173 Members credit the 
program’s continuing success to its 50-year duration, which has instilled 
acceptance of pro bono as the norm of practice, and to its even-handed 
structure, which includes no exemptions.174 Still, bar membership itself is 
voluntary,175 and an initiative to implement the Orange County plan on a 
statewide basis was unsuccessful.176  
                                                                                                             
 170. Cf. Loder, supra note 137, at 474–75 (“[I]t is surely premature to rule out 
a pro bono requirement by relying on limited research.”). 
 171. See, e.g., Deborah L. Rhode, Pro Bono in Principle and in Practice, 53 
J. LEGAL EDUC. 413, 425–26 (2003) (describing the ABA’s rejection of 
mandatory pro bono initiatives in 1983, 1993, and 2001).  
 172. Cummings & Sandefur, supra note 120, at 84 & n.7; see also Wechsler, 
supra note 153, at 920–21, 921 n.77 (identifying seven counties with mandatory 
pro bono programs in 1987). El Paso County, Texas, another “renegade 
jurisdiction,” see Cummings & Sandefur, supra note 120, at 84 & n.7, required 
county bar members to accept pro bono criminal defense work; that program, 
however, was suspended in 2014 for reasons that are unclear. See Kendra Emi 
Nitta, Comment, An Ethical Evaluation of Mandatory Pro Bono, 29 LOY. L.A. L. 
REV. 909, 934 (1996) (describing the El Paso program); Email correspondence 
with Nancy Gallego, Executive Director, El Paso Bar Association (Apr. 27, 2016) 
(on file with author) (confirming discontinuance of program, but providing no 
reason). 
 173. See Pro Bono Policy of the Legal Aid Society Board of Trustees, LEGAL 
AID SOC’Y OF THE ORANGE CTY. BAR ASS’N, http://www.legalaidocba.org/pro-
bono-policy (last visited Sept. 30, 2017) [https://perma.cc/YTA2-KTK8]; 
Catherine A. Tucker, Celebrating 50 Years: History of the Pro Bono Program of 
the Legal Aid Society of the Orange County Bar Association, Inc., THE BRIEFS, 
Oct. 2010, at 13. 
 174. See Wechsler, supra note 153, at 935–37 (describing Orange County 
attorney survey results); Tucker, supra note 173, at 13. 
 175. See Lardent, supra note 141, at 80 (“Voluntary bar programs which 
condition membership on the commitment to provide service or funds, like the 
program in Orange County, Florida, certainly are not mandatory since the only 
‘sanction’—the inability to join the local bar—has no direct economic or 
professional impact on the attorney.”). 
 176. See History of Pro Bono Legal Assistance in Florida, FLORIDAPROBONO, 
http://www.floridaprobono.org/about/item.3304-History_of_Pro_Bono_Legal  
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The closest analogy to a statewide pro bono requirement is found in 
New Jersey, where most bar members must register with the Superior 
Court’s pro bono appointment system.177 If assigned a case, the attorney is 
required to accept it, though the system exempts various categories of 
attorneys, including those who performed 25 qualifying pro bono hours in 
the preceding year.178 The New Jersey system is a substantial step short of 
mandatory pro bono, as attorneys are not assigned cases on a yearly, 
biannual, or other regular basis.179 Still, New Jersey attorneys tend to 
perceive themselves as being under a pro bono requirement, and many 
resent the imposition.180  
The literature reveals no current assessments of the New Jersey 
system’s effectiveness in addressing that state’s justice gap. In 2015, the 
                                                                                                             
_Assistance_in_Florida (last visited Sept. 30, 2017) [https://perma.cc/H868-JUZ9].   
 177. See New Jersey Pro Bono Information, N.J. COURTS, http://www.njcourts 
.gov/attorneys/probono.html (last visited Sept. 30, 2017) (“Attorneys are assigned 
pro bono cases through the Administrative Office of the Court’s pro bono computer 
system, which maintains an alphabetical list of attorneys eligible for pro bono 
assignment for each county.”) [https://perma.cc/DL4T-VRSB]. The obligation 
stems from Madden v. Twp. of Delran, 601 A.2d 211, 222 (N.J. 1992), which held 
that New Jersey attorneys must accept, without pay, judicial assignment to 
represent indigent defendants.  
 178. Also exempted are government attorneys, legal services attorneys, and 
retired attorneys. Memorandum from Glenn A. Grant, J.A.D. to Members of the 
N.J. Bar (Dec. 29, 2015), http://www.njcourts.gov/attorneys/assets/probono 
/memotothebaronexemptions.pdf [https://perma.cc/S2Z8-K2PB]. The pro bono 
exemption—similar to the broad “pro bono” definition in Model Rule 6.1—
includes work not only for direct service providers, but also for other “nonprofit 
charitable, religious, civic, community, or educational organizations or 
governmental entities . . . where payment of standard legal fees would 
significantly deplete the organization’s or entity’s economic resources or would 
otherwise be inappropriate.” 1 N.J. PRAC., CT. R. ANN 1:21-11(a)(iv).  
 179. See Frequently Asked Questions—Pro Bono Assignments, N.J. COURTS, 
http://www.njcourts.gov/attorneys/assets/probono/probonofaq.pdf (last visited 
Nov. 9, 2017) (“Attorneys are called upon whenever their name reaches the top 
of the list. For example, depending on the county, an attorney may be required to 
complete two cases a year or one case every two years.”) [https://perma.cc/E6GA-
2SLR]. 
 180. See, e.g., John M. Covaleski, More Pro Bono? A Case with Legs, N.J.L.: 
WKLY. NEWSPAPER, July 4, 2005, at 1 (“New Jersey is believed the only state 
with mandatory pro bono, a fact that has long infuriated private practitioners 
here.”); MichaelAnn Knotts, More Mandatory Pro Bono Likely?, N.J.L.: WKLY. 
NEWSPAPER, July 21, 2003, at 1 (“The mandatory pro bono system has long 
infuriated many lawyers in New Jersey, the only state in the nation in which 
attorneys are forced to take on cases for free.”). 
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Superior Court assigned 1,546 pro bono cases, but the judiciary does not 
keep track of how often each individual attorney is assigned to a case, how 
many hours are spent handling such cases, or how well such cases are 
handled.181 The literature also does not reveal why the New Jersey system 
apparently is the subject of widespread resentment, when Orange County 
attorneys do not seem to share that feeling about their system.182 The 
difference could stem from the fact that Orange County bar membership 
is optional, that its pro bono requirements apply to all bar members without 
exception, or that its system is administered through Legal Aid rather than 
through the court system. Determining the cause of the difference could 
shine a much-needed light on more and less effective mandatory models. 
C. Shifting Responsibility to Aspiring Attorneys 
With pro bono participation rates far below 50 hours per year and with 
little support from attorneys for imposing a pro bono requirement on 
themselves, the profession has turned its gaze to a group with little ability 
to protest: aspiring attorneys—a group that includes both recent law school 
graduates applying for bar admission and current law students.183 The bar 
applicant effort seems to have stalled after a successful push in New York, 
and the law student effort—although fairly widespread—has yet to 
demonstrate the anticipated benefits. 
Beginning in 2015, New York has required applicants to complete 50 
pro bono hours as a condition of admission to the bar.184 Supporters 
believed that the new requirement would both help address New York’s 
justice gap and “ensure that all lawyers who practice in New York 
                                                                                                             
 181. Email from Julie A. Higg, Chief of Judicial Services (May 18, 2016) (on 
file with author). The 1,546 attorneys to whom these cases were assigned 
represent approximately 3.5% of the 41,569 lawyers active in New Jersey in 2015. 
See ABA National Lawyer Population Survey, supra note 19. 
 182. See supra note 174 and accompanying text. 
 183. See, e.g., Atkinson, supra note 134, at 162 (arguing that mandatory 
student pro bono is unfair for a variety of reasons, including that law students 
“have the least say in their professional obligations”); Cummings & Sandefur, 
supra note 120, at 84 (“[U]nwilling to directly force lawyers to provide mandatory 
services, [New York]’s chief judge issued a rule targeting aspirants—requiring 
law students to perform fifty hours of unpaid work as a condition of bar 
admission.”). 
 184. See N.Y. CT. R. § 520.16. A 1997 effort to mandate pro bono service for 
all New York attorneys was widely and successfully resisted by rank-and-file bar 
members. Granfield, supra note 90, at 1362–64. 
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understand that a culture of service is a core value of our profession.”185 
Initial reports attest to the ready availability of pro bono opportunities for 
all New York applicants who require them,186 but it is premature to assess 
the program’s overall efficacy.187 
No other state has followed New York’s lead.188 In 2016, California 
Governor Jerry Brown vetoed a similar measure, citing the unfair extra 
burden that the pro bono requirement would foist on new law graduates, 
many of whom already were burdened with enormous debt.189 Governor 
Brown suggested that lowering the cost of law school would more 
effectively expand new graduates’ pro bono opportunities.190 Measures 
also stalled in Connecticut and New Jersey, with court-sponsored study 
groups opining that law schools in those states already had undertaken 
measures to instill in students a sense of the importance of pro bono 
work.191 
Indeed, law schools have implemented programs to promote student 
pro bono, an effort that has taken on additional urgency with recent 
                                                                                                             
 185. Jonathan Lippmann, New York’s Template to Address the Crisis in Civil 
Legal Services, 7 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 13, 26 (2013). 
 186. See Stephen Ceasar, State Bar Considers Requiring All Law Students to 
Do Free Legal Work, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 12, 2015, 4:00 AM), http://www.la 
times.com/local/california/la-me-adv-legal-aid-students-20150312-story.html  
[https://perma.cc/2YM3-R8BC]; Cheryl Miller, Would-Be Lawyers May Have to 
Give It Away, RECORDER (Mar. 4, 2016), http://www.therecorder.com/id=120 
2751484819/WouldBe-Lawyers-May-Have-to-Give-It-Away?slreturn=2017010  
3223624 [https://perma.cc/GB3Q-62YQ]. 
 187. See Andrew Denney, Q&A: Helaine Barnett, N.Y.L.J. (Mar. 4, 2016), 
http://www.newyorklawjournal.com/id=1202751284803/QA-Helaine-Barnett?slre 
turn=20170029113736 [https://perma.cc/95BV-G4VA]; Miller, supra note 186.  
 188. See Bar Pre-Admission Pro Bono, AM. BAR ASS’N, http://www.american 
bar.org/groups/probono_public_service/policy/bar_pre_admission_pro_bono.html  
(last visited Sept. 30, 2017) (listing states considering pre-admission pro bono 
requirements) [https://perma.cc/TDR2-R5Q3]. 
 189. David Siders, Pro Bono Rule for New California Lawyers? Not So Fast, 
Jerry Brown Says, SACRAMENTO BEE (Aug. 29, 2016, 6:16 PM), http://www.sac 
bee.com/news/politics-government/capitol-alert/article98734647.html [https://per 
ma.cc/BRX6-NTZT]. 
 190. Id.  
 191. See Karen Sloan, Pro Bono Mandate Gains Steam, NAT’L L.J. (Apr. 23, 
2013), http://www.nationallawjournal.com/id=1202596770850/Pro-Bono-Man 
date-Gains-Steam?slreturn=20170029114151 (describing California’s then-
ascendant proposal as well as the stalled Connecticut and New Jersey proposals) 
[https://perma.cc/2AT3-GHLF]. 
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pressures to produce “practice ready” graduates.192 The ABA requires law 
schools to provide “substantial” pro bono opportunities for all students.193 
More specifically, the American Association of Law Schools (“AALS”) 
requires schools to offer students a “well-supervised pro bono 
opportunity” that is either required or made attractive enough to encourage 
“the great majority of students” to participate.194 As of August 2017, 42 
accredited law schools required student pro bono or other public or 
community service as a condition of graduation, and another 124 had 
formal programs in place to encourage student pro bono, with paid 
coordinators or other administrative support.195 
In addition to developing professional skills, the hope is that student 
pro bono programs will instill a “life-long habit of service” that endures 
throughout an attorney’s career.196 Law schools have experimented with a 
variety of innovative student pro bono programs to meet this goal.197 The 
existing data on student pro bono efforts, however, demonstrates that no 
student pro bono model—neither mandatory programs nor strongly 
supported voluntary programs—increases participants’ post-graduation 
pro bono rates.198 
                                                                                                             
 192. See ALLIANCE FOR EXPERIENTIAL LEARNING IN LAW, Experience the 
Future: Papers from the Second National Symposium on Experiential Education 
in Law, 7 ELON L. REV. 1, 78 (2015). 
 193. See AM. BAR ASS’N, A.B.A. STANDARDS AND RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR 
APPROVAL OF LAW SCHOOLS 2015-2016, at 16 (2016).  
 194. See ASS’N OF AM. LAW SCHOOLS, LEARNING TO SERVE: THE FINDINGS 
AND PROPOSALS OF THE AALS COMMISSION ON PRO BONO AND PUBLIC SERVICE 
OPPORTUNITIES 359 (Oct. 1999). 
 195. See Pro Bono Programs Chart, AM. BAR ASS’N, http://www.americanbar 
.org/groups/probono_public_service/resources/directory_of_law_school_public_
interest_pro_bono_programs/pb_programs__chart.html (last updated Sept. 21, 
2017) [https://perma.cc/6ATV-XZQA]. Most of the mandatory programs require 
20–70 hours of law-related pro bono service before graduation. Id.  
 196. See, e.g., Cummings & Sandefur, supra note 120, at 93. 
 197. See, e.g., Lisa A. Kloppenberg & Lori E. Shaw, Pro Bono: Assessing Aims 
and Achievement, 40 U. TOL. L. REV. 357 (2009) (describing a voluntary student pro 
bono program at University of Dayton Law School); Richard F. Storrow & Patti 
Gearhart Turner, Where Equal Justice Begins: Mandatory Pro Bono in American 
Legal Education, 72 UMKC L. REV. 493 (2003) (describing a mandatory student 
pro bono program at Texas Wesleyan University School of Law). 
 198. See Faith-Slaker, supra note 76, at 279–80. A study by Professor Rhode 
found that a “positive experience” with law school pro bono “may increase 
participants’ desire for future opportunities [and] their understanding of pro bono 
service as a professional obligation.” That interest, however, did not translate into 
increased pro bono service after graduation, regardless of whether respondents 
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One reason why law student pro bono programs do not achieve the 
desired “pro bono habit” may stem from law professors’ failures to model 
any such “habit” themselves, conveying the impression that pro bono 
obligations are appropriately shouldered by those lowest on the 
professional totem pole.199 Students seem to recognize the distinction in 
pro bono expectations for themselves and their teachers.200 Respondents 
to a survey of recent law graduates, for example, expressed dissatisfaction 
with faculty indifference to pro bono, perceiving that professors neither 
undertake such work themselves nor emphasize pro bono themes in their 
classrooms.201 As addressed below, students’ perceptions in this regard are 
well-founded.  
IV. LAW FACULTY: THE RIGHT FIT FOR A MANDATORY 
PRO BONO TEST CASE 
Dean Chemerinsky’s 2004 call for mandatory faculty pro bono, or at 
least a serious discussion of the topic, has yet to materialize.202 Every 
indication is that law professors’ view of their own pro bono obligations 
remains now as he observed it then: a worthwhile activity, perhaps, but not 
an integral facet of legal academic life.203 A reconsideration of law 
faculties’ self-awarded pro bono pass is long overdue. A mandatory pro 
bono test case focused on law faculty would respond to the intersection of 
the three current problems discussed above: (1) the insufficient pro bono 
hours provided to those in need; (2) the dearth of mandatory pro bono 
initiatives to study and learn from; and (3) the widely shared but unachieved 
goal of instilling a “pro bono habit” in those who aspire to enter the 
profession.  
                                                                                                             
participated in mandatory or voluntary programs while in school. RHODE, supra 
note 6, at 160–64; see also Granfield, supra note 90, at 1372–73, 1380–94 (finding 
no relationship between type of law school pro bono program and subsequent pro 
bono work). 
 199. See Atkinson, supra note 134, at 161–65. 
 200. See RHODE, supra note 6, at 170. 
 201. Id.  
 202. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.  
 203. See Chemerinsky, supra note 5, at 1238 (“[M]y sense in most law schools 
is that a faculty member’s pro bono work is looked on about the same as if he or 
she likes to hike on weekends.”). 
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The rationale for mandatory pro bono applies at least as strongly to 
law professors as it does to other attorneys.204 As is true for other sectors 
of the profession, law faculty benefit handsomely from the monopolistic 
conditions that contribute to the continuing justice gap.205 Almost all states 
require law school graduation as a condition of bar admission,206 which 
keeps tuition dollars flowing. UPL rules protect attorney incomes, some 
part of which find their way back to law schools through alumni donations. 
These law school and UPL requirements contribute substantially to law 
faculty salaries, the highest in academia,207 and depress the availability of 
free and affordable representation.208  
Nonetheless, many law professors strenuously object to participating 
in pro bono work, partly due to practical concerns, such as lack of ability 
and time, and partly due to self-identification more as scholars than as 
attorneys.209 Faculty at one school rejected a pro bono requirement for 
professors mere “seconds” after approving such a requirement for students.210 
At another school, the committee proposing mandatory student pro bono 
declined to even suggest such a requirement for faculty, fearing that doing 
so might derail the entire proposal.211 
With so little support for mandatory pro bono generally and faculty 
resistance to engaging even voluntarily in pro bono work, adoption of a 
widespread faculty pro bono requirement is—realistically—nowhere on 
the horizon. Certainly, no such change appears forthcoming from the 
profession itself, which takes such broad and vague positions on faculty 
                                                                                                             
 204. See supra notes 128–133 and accompanying text; cf. Luban, supra note 
164, at 58–59 (arguing that law faculty, like other attorneys, have a moral 
obligation to voluntarily participate in pro bono work).  
 205. See Chemerinsky, supra note 5, at 1238; Luban, supra note 164, at 64–
68; Deborah L. Rhode, The Professional Responsibilities of Professors, 51 J. 
LEGAL EDUC. 158, 162 (2001). 
 206. A small number of states allow multi-year apprenticeships in lieu of law 
school, but few aspiring attorneys take this route, and even fewer succeed. See, 
e.g., Sean Patrick Farrell, The Lawyer’s Apprentice, N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 2014, 
at ED22 (reporting that only 60 of 83,986 people who took a bar exam in 2013 
had not attended law school; of these, 17 passed the exam).  
 207. See Akane Otani, The Highest-Paid Professors in the U.S., BLOOMBERG 
(Mar. 17, 2015, 10:18 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-03-
17/the-highest-paid-professors-in-the-u-s- [https://perma.cc/EXL9-FQC2]. 
 208. See supra note 128 and accompanying text. 
 209. See Luban, supra note 164, at 66–67; Mogill, supra note 134, at 30–31; 
see also Rhode, supra note 6, at 54 (noting law professors’ “sanctimonious” 
resistance and insistence that “[e]verything [they] do is pro bono”). 
 210. Atkinson, supra note 134, at 161; see also Luban, supra note 164, at 66. 
 211. Storrow & Turner, supra note 197, at 499.  
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pro bono that it is difficult to discern what, if anything, is expected.212 
Moreover, given the legal profession’s lack of experience with mandatory 
pro bono generally, adoption of a nationwide requirement for faculty 
would be premature at best—there is simply too little information 
regarding what an effective and fair program would entail.  
Entirely feasible and appropriate, however, would be a school-by-
school approach, with the faculty at individual law schools voting to 
impose pro bono requirements on themselves.213 Many schools support 
faculty pro bono by various means, including the consideration of pro 
bono work in salary raise determinations.214 A few law schools require 
“public service” by faculty, which may be fulfilled by the type of work 
that non-attorneys equally are able to perform.215 As a general matter, 
however, law schools have not taken the further step of requiring faculty 
to engage in legal pro bono work.216 
                                                                                                             
 212. See AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 193, at 28 (identifying “[s]ervice to the 
public, including participation in pro bono activities” as a “core” responsibility to 
be fulfilled by the full-time faculty “as a collective body” in Standard 404(a)(6)); 
Bylaws, ASS’N OF AM. LAW SCHOOLS, http://www.aals.org/about/handbook/by 
laws/ (last updated Jan. 2016) (stating in Section 6-1(b)(1) that “the Association 
values and expects its member schools to value . . . a faculty . . . devoted to 
fostering justice and public service . . . .”) [https://perma.cc/ZB52-K5XW]; 
Statement of Good Practices by Law Professors in the Discharge of their Ethical 
and Professional Responsibilities, in ASS’N OF AM. LAW SCHOOLS, 2016 
HANDBOOK 119, 125 (2016) (stating that law professors share the profession’s 
“traditional obligation[]” to “engage in uncompensated public service or pro bono 
legal activities”). 
 213. Cf. Emily Zimmerman, Should Law Professors Have a Continuing 
Practice Experience (CPE) Requirement?, 6 NE. U. L.J. 131, 164–65 (2013) 
(arguing that the most realistic option for instituting a law faculty “continuing 
practice experience” requirement would be to leave the decision up to individual 
law schools). 
 214. An ABA webpage listing faculty pro bono programs at many law schools 
provides a good sense of these incentives. See Law School Pro Bono Programs: 
Faculty and Administrative Pro Bono, AM. BAR ASS’N, https://www.americanbar 
.org/groups/probono_public_service/resources/directory_of_law_school_public_
interest_pro_bono_programs/definitions/pb_faculty.html (last updated Aug. 23, 
2016) [https://perma.cc/778U-E97S]. 
 215. See id.; see also Communications with law faculty at Lincoln Memorial 
University and Stetson University (Dec. 2016 & Jan. 2017) (notes on file with 
author).  
 216. The ABA webpage listing faculty pro bono programs identifies two 
schools as requiring faculty pro bono, but efforts to confirm this information were 
unsuccessful. See notes on file with author. Although this page was updated in 
August 2016, the information is not fully up to date—it does not, for example, 
590 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 78 
 
 
 
Western New England University School of Law (“WNE”) is an 
exception. When WNE adopted a student pro bono requirement in 2012, 
it adopted a similar requirement for faculty, amounting to 20 hours of legal 
pro bono work per professor per year.217 WNE has yet to assess formally 
the impact of its faculty requirement, but anecdotal reports suggest that 
WNE professors—having voted the requirement on themselves—accept it 
as part of the norm of their academic life, and many exceed the 20-hour 
requirement.218  
Other law schools should follow suit. The benefits of individual school 
adoption would be substantial for the additional clients who would obtain 
needed legal representation. In the bigger picture, adding test case schools 
to the mandatory pro bono roster would increase the profession’s 
understanding of such programs’ potential to make a more significant dent 
in the justice gap—both by better inculcating the “pro bono habit” in 
students and by adding more attorneys to the pro bono rolls.219 Researchers 
likely would gain a variety of models to study because schools would 
adopt programs best suited to their individual needs.  
Benefits also would inure to participating schools. Student pro bono 
programs no longer would suffer the inconsistency of faculty 
disengagement, and classroom impacts could be significant as well. Law 
schools train students who overwhelmingly attend with the goal of 
becoming practicing attorneys, but most of their teachers have little 
exposure to practice.220 Even those who practiced law before academia 
become ever further removed from the practicing world. A pro bono 
requirement would help bridge that gap, enriching professors’ classrooms 
and scholarship with a greater understanding of the territory into which 
they send their students.221 
                                                                                                             
include Western New England’s mandatory program. See Law School Pro Bono 
Programs: Faculty and Administrative Pro Bono, supra note 214. 
 217. Cultivating a Service Ethos: The Pro Bono Requirement, PERSPECTIVES: 
W. NEW ENGLAND UNIV. SCH. OF LAW, Spring 2013, at 7. By requiring “law-
related” work for both students and faculty, WNE excludes charitable community 
service projects such as building homes and delivering food. See Frequently Asked 
Questions, W. NEW ENGLAND UNIV. SCH. OF LAW, http://www1.wne.edu/law 
/registrar/pro-bono-Frequestly%20Asked%20Questions.cfm (last visited Sept. 30, 
2017) [https://perma.cc/CD8P-K2GS]. 
 218. Communications with WNE law faculty (December 2016) (notes on file 
with author). 
 219. See Mogill, supra note 134, at 29. 
 220. See, e.g., Zimmerman, supra note 213, at 137–38. 
 221. See Chemerinsky, supra note 5, at 1240; Mogill, supra note 134, at 31–32; 
cf. Zimmerman, supra note 213, at 160–62, 176–77 (arguing that law professors 
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Communications teams at participating schools could ensure positive 
press attention. The headlines suggest themselves: benefit to clients and 
community, benefit to students, and benefit to the institution as one of the 
few law schools where professors truly “walk the walk.” The payoff in 
newsworthiness certainly would be welcome in a time of shrinking 
enrollments and fierce competition for tuition dollars and alumni 
contributions.222  
The profession should undertake incentives to encourage mandatory pro 
bono initiatives for faculty. In particular, a mandatory CLE exemption for 
faculty at participating schools is a feasible option worth pursuing. 
California already exempts full-time law faculty from mandatory CLE 
requirements.223 In determining that the California faculty exemption was 
not unconstitutional on equal protection grounds, the California Supreme 
Court observed that faculty representing clients were more likely than 
other attorneys to practice within their fields of expertise and also more 
likely to stay abreast of current developments in all areas of the law.224 
This reasoning from California provides a solid argument for law faculty 
elsewhere, particularly as part of a mandatory pro bono package. 
Such an exemption from state-mandated CLE requirements would be 
a modest and logical extension of the movement toward granting 
mandatory CLE credit for pro bono hours.225 The exemption proposal 
could be bolstered with a provision detailing the obligation of faculty at 
participating schools to undertake any instruction necessary for successful 
pro bono representation. Thus, any continuing education required under 
this scheme actually would serve the competence purpose in stark contrast 
to current mandatory CLE requirements.226 
                                                                                                             
should have a “continuing practice experience” requirement for these reasons, 
though the requirement need not be fulfilled only through pro bono projects). 
 222. Many observers have documented law schools’ declining fortunes. See, 
e.g., Victor Marrero, Essay, The Cost of Rules, The Rule of Costs,  37 CARDOZO 
L. REV. 1599, 1620 (2016); Donald J. Polden, Leading Institutional Change: Law 
Schools and Legal Education in a Time of Crisis, 83 TENN. L. REV. 949, 950–51 
(2016). 
 223. See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 6070(c) (West 2017). Following the ABA 
MODEL RULE FOR MINIMUM CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION, supra note 15, at § 
3(B)(4), the mandatory CLE rules in North Carolina and Tennessee exempt full-
time law professors so long as they do not engage in the practice of law, thus 
creating a perverse incentive for law faculty not to engage in pro bono work. See 
27 N.C.A.C. ch. 1D, § .1517(e); TENN. SUP. CT. R. 21 § 2.04(e). 
 224. See Warden v. State Bar of Cal., 982 P.2d 154, 166 (Cal. 1999). 
 225. See supra note 154 and accompanying text. 
 226. Some pro bono organizations already offer CLE programs to volunteers. 
Harris, supra note 7, at 364; see also Megan Cooley, Shauna Wright & Philip 
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Acknowledging the potential need for training also would address a 
primary practical concern—law faculty are among the least qualified 
attorneys to handle pro bono matters given their removal from actual 
practice. As with any other unfamiliar professional endeavor, however, a 
pro bono attorney must take whatever steps as are necessary to render 
competent representation, and no reason supports the contention that law 
professors would be derelict in that duty.227 Moreover, the substantive 
competency necessary for effective representation might be less daunting 
than some faculty fear. The positive impact of attorney representation in 
many civil matters flows less from the attorney’s deep understanding of 
the relevant law than from the attorney’s ability to navigate simple 
procedures and courthouse relationships.228  
The qualifying pro bono work for faculty would not have to involve 
courtroom representation of individual clients. Because faculty would 
impose the requirement on themselves, they could determine the 
parameters of the program, including what qualifies as pro bono work. For 
example, the legal needs of indigent persons span an enormous range of 
subject areas, including tax, civil rights, bankruptcy, domestic relations, 
and estate planning—areas with which many faculty have substantial 
expertise that could be useful to organizations providing direct representation 
or that advocate for broader change.229 
                                                                                                             
Vickers, For the Good of Your City: How Law Firm Pro Bono Can Impact Clients 
and the Community, 79 TEX. B.J. 364, 365 (2016) (describing Tarrant County 
Volunteer Attorney Services program providing free CLE hours to volunteers 
who are then assigned uncomplicated family law cases); Phong Wong, MCLE 
Opportunities Through Nonprofit Legal Services Organizations, L.A. LAW., Mar. 
2016, at 10 (describing free CLE courses provided by California legal services 
offices “in an effort to increase pro bono participation”).  
 227. See Luban, supra note 164, at 72. Indeed, the academic calendar and 
access to sabbatical and other leaves may provide more training opportunities than 
exist for other attorneys.  
 228. See Sandefur, supra note 129, at 911, 926–27. Sandefur’s conclusion 
from this data is that although universal attorney representation is impractical, 
alternatives should be developed that give clients and non-attorney assistants the 
tools necessary for similarly improved outcomes. See id.  
 229. See Luban, supra note 164, at 72–73 (describing the wide variety of pro 
bono matters in which law faculty could become involved). On the other hand, 
schools should be mindful of not defining qualifying “pro bono” work so broadly 
that individuals unable to afford legal representation are poorly served by the 
increased hours. Cf. Chemerinsky, supra note 5, at 1244 (arguing that faculty pro 
bono “must be for causes or clients that otherwise would not have legal 
representation”). 
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Another practical objection may be that some professors are not 
admitted to the state bar where the school is situated or, indeed, any bar at 
all. The easiest scenario for adoption would be at a school where all faculty 
are admitted to the local bar.230 Professors admitted elsewhere, however, 
still may be able to represent clients locally through reciprocal admission 
agreements or court-approved admission for a particular matter.231 
Additionally, some jurisdictions make exceptions to unauthorized practice 
restrictions for certain types of pro bono representation.232 Faculty who are 
not members of any bar might provide research or other assistance to legal 
services organizations in a manner that would not violate unauthorized 
practice restrictions. At a minimum, faculty should provide the same law-
related assistance required or encouraged of their students, who, of course, 
also are not admitted to the bar.233 
Designing a program with an appropriate degree of flexibility would 
require faculties to consider a host of questions:  
(1) Should particular pro bono experiences be encouraged, and should 
such experiences occur in the law school’s own clinics?234 A related issue 
concerns the extent to which clinical faculty are expected to provide 
training and oversight. For non-clinical faculty, the convenience and 
comfort of training by trusted colleagues may be attractive. From the 
perspective of clinical faculty, however, the added burden may interfere 
substantially with other responsibilities.235  
                                                                                                             
 230. See, e.g., Elon Law Faculty: Committed to Teaching, Scholarship & 
Service, ELON LAW, https://www.elon.edu/e/law/faculty/index.html (last visited 
Sept. 30, 2017) (“All Elon Law professors are members of the North Carolina Bar 
Association.”) [https://perma.cc/B76U-JHDR]. 
 231.  See, e.g., Pamela A. McManus, Have Law License; Will Travel, 15 GEO. 
J. LEGAL ETHICS 527, 533–34 (2002). 
 232. The District of Columbia, for example, permits inactive D.C. bar 
members to provide pro bono representation through affiliation with legal services 
providers, D.C. CT. APP. R. 49(c)(9)(b), and allows non-members to provide 
representation in connection with specifically authorized court programs, R. 
49(c)(10).  
 233. See RHODE, supra note 33, at 461 (proposing various law school reforms, 
including “pro bono contributions by faculty at levels comparable to those 
expected of students”). 
 234. See generally Laura Rovner, Unforeseen Ethical Ramifications of Classroom 
Faculty Participation in Law School Clinics, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 1113 (2007) 
(analyzing pros and cons of non-clinical faculty participation in law school clinics). 
 235. Moreover, clinical professors tend to be of lower status than their “podium” 
colleagues. See, e.g., Todd A. Berger, Three Generations and Two Tiers: How 
Participation in Law School Clinics and the Demand for “Practice-Ready” 
Graduates Will Impact the Faculty Status of Clinical Law Professors, 43 WASH. U. 
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(2) Should the obligation fall on each professor individually or could 
the faculty fulfill the obligation collectively? If the objective primarily is 
to provide more hours of service, collective fulfillment might be attractive. 
Such an arrangement, however, would forego full-faculty pro bono 
modeling for students, and, again, the temptation may be to foist the 
obligation disproportionately on clinical faculty.  
(3) Should the school provide concrete institutional support for faculty 
pro bono efforts? Such support might include administrative assistance, pro 
bono leaves of absence, and stipends to support and reward particularly 
intensive pro bono work.236 A school’s willingness to provide such support 
would need to be balanced against the school’s need for adequate teaching 
coverage and funds for faculty scholarship.  
(4) Should the school require the ABA’s recommended 50 annual hours 
or a different number, and over what time span?237 One way to avoid the 
inevitable conflicts that will arise for some professors in any given year is 
to require the desired number of hours over the course of three years rather 
than requiring one-third of that amount in each year. Such an arrangement 
also would have the potential advantage of encouraging a deeper commitment 
to a single matter rather than superficial assistance in several. Another option 
for greater flexibility would be to permit a financial contribution to a legal 
services program in lieu of personal work, at least on an occasional basis.  
The list of program design questions continues. Could the malpractice 
policy that covers a school’s clinic participants be expanded to cover other 
faculty? How would faculty compliance be monitored and enforced? 
Would service exceeding the expected minimum be a part of salary 
considerations? Law schools should not be daunted by the long list of open 
questions; rather, they should embrace the uncertainty as an opportunity 
for innovation, study, and service.  
                                                                                                             
J.L. & POL’Y 129, 135–36 (2013). This imbalance may make it difficult for a clinician 
to refuse or even to voice her concerns regarding additional responsibilities stemming 
from a faculty pro bono requirement.   
 236. By way of example, Georgetown University Law Center provides summer 
pro bono grants that are equal in amount to summer scholarship grants. Grants are 
available to support a “substantial” public service project, “particularly where it 
furthers a faculty member’s teaching and scholarship.” GEO. UNIV. LAW CTR., 
FACULTY PRO BONO PROPOSAL (Nov. 1, 2000, rev. March 2003) (on file with author).  
 237. Both Dean Chemerinsky and Professor Luban proposed 50 hours per year 
as reasonable for law faculty. See Chemerinsky, supra note 5, at 1244; Luban, 
supra note 164, at 60. 
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CONCLUSION 
Almost a half century of experience and debate demonstrates that the 
status quo has not served its purposes. Mandatory CLE does not impact 
attorney competence, and voluntary pro bono has made an insufficient dent 
in the need for free legal services. The profession has responded with little 
more than tinkering around the edges—tweaking mandatory CLE courses 
here and there and exhorting attorneys to voluntarily contribute more pro 
bono hours.  
The lack of data connecting mandatory CLE with improved competence 
justifies eliminating the requirement. Mandatory CLE earns hundreds of 
millions of dollars in tuition revenues for course purveyors but provides no 
discernible public benefit. Although many attorneys undoubtedly gain some 
measure of improved competence from particular CLE courses, no evidence 
supports the efficacy of a broad requirement.  
The substantial need for increased free legal representation cannot be 
disputed, and the bar has long recognized attorneys’ general responsibility for 
providing pro bono hours. Imposing a pro bono requirement, however, is both 
impracticable and unjustified at this time. The legal profession evinces no 
willingness to impose or accept a mandatory pro bono system. Moreover, the 
profession’s lack of experience with mandatory pro bono programs leaves 
researchers with little data to determine whether and how mandatory pro bono 
might help close the vast justice gap.  
Under these circumstances, a test case approach to mandatory pro bono 
is warranted with law faculty as its focus. Law professors benefit substantially 
from law practice restrictions that exacerbate the justice gap. Law professors 
also produce the future attorneys who hopefully will expand the profession’s 
pro bono commitment. Law professors themselves, however, are poor pro 
bono contributors. The negative ramifications of this imbalance affect 
students, law schools, clients, and the profession. On a school-by-school 
basis, law professors should pick up the gauntlet thrown down by Dean 
Chemerinsky in 2004238 and impose mandatory pro bono on themselves.  
                                                                                                             
 238. See supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
